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I. Executive Summary

Allegations emerged prior to 24 February 2022 that Russia was planning a campaign to capture or kill potential opposition figures and leading residents of occupied areas in Ukraine. The Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) has documented allegations of detention and disappearance in Kherson oblast consistent with an intentional and targeted campaign. This report, produced as part of the Conflict Observatory, documents the detentions and disappearances of 226 individuals in Kherson oblast between March and October 2022.

Approximately one quarter of individuals documented herein were allegedly tortured and five are known to have died while in custody or shortly thereafter, all allegedly because of torture they experienced in detention. More than half of all individuals in this dataset are either still detained, disappeared, or their status is not publicly known; less than half are known to have been released. Most individuals were detained by Russia’s military or Federal Security Service (FSB) rather than local Russia-aligned forces, and over half of abductions and apprehensions occurred at individuals’ homes. The demographic and professional profiles of these individuals demonstrate a pattern that reflects the pre-meditated campaign alleged before the invasion.

These findings demonstrate a range of alarming allegations about treatment of detainees, including allegations of deaths in custody; the widespread use of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment (CIDT); pillage from detainees; sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV); forced participation in propaganda videos; enforced disappearances; potential reprisal detentions; threats to relatives; and monitoring, tampering with, or seizure of electronic devices. At least one individual reported witnessing the execution of five prisoners of war detained at the same location as him. Among the accounts of torture and CIDT were allegations of beatings, electric shock, sleep deprivation, stress positions, sensory overload, temperature manipulation, mock executions, denial of medical care, denial of sufficient food and water, and overcrowding.

These individual reports of detention and disappearance demonstrate patterns consistent with the alleged plans for intentional targeting described in pre-invasion reports. Since the invasion, multiple accounts of lists associated with individual apprehensions have been reported by witnesses, local officials, and individuals who were themselves detained. These include many current and former government officials, civil society leaders or volunteers, educators, veterans, law enforcement and security services, and journalists. The identified cohort was overwhelmingly composed of military-aged men: among those with known ages, 79.1% were men between 18 and 60.

Finally, Yale HRL documented a significant number of Crimean Tatars, a historically marginalized group, being present in this data set. The 32 Crimean Tatars included here appear less likely than other detained and disappeared people to be released and substantially more likely than others in the dataset to be charged with a crime. They were also more likely than non-Crimean Tatars to be detained at checkpoints on the border with Crimea. Over a third of Crimean Tatars in this data set have been accused of membership in the Noman Çelebicihan Battalion, a Crimean Tatar group that Russia declared a terrorist organization in 2022. Human rights organizations describe the

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1. This statistic reflects only the individuals in the dataset for whom age information is available. The range of 18-60 years old is the age range for military service under Ukrainian law, excepting only the most senior officers, who can be up to 65 years old. Eighteen-to-sixty is also the age range for males who are not allowed to leave Ukraine under martial law, except in certain circumstances. To serve in the Ukrainian armed forces, additional qualifications must also be met. See: Верховна Рада України, “Про військовий обов’язок і військову службу,” Офіційний вебпортал парламенту України, Accessed November 11, 2022. https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/doc/2232-12, https://perma.cc/ZS92-6AJH.

group as a civic organization and no other countries have designated it as a terrorist organization. Some Tatar individuals were allegedly detained or disappeared based on their presence on a list of members of this group or affiliation with the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, an official representative body.

The groups identified in this report reflect the types of people that pre-invasion reports of Russia’s lists alleged would be targeted for capture and/or death. The United States government alleged in the week before the invasion that Russia “would likely target those who oppose Russian actions—journalists and anti-corruption activists, and vulnerable populations such as religious and ethnic minorities and LGBTQI+ persons. Specifically, [the US Government has]...credible information that indicates Russian forces are creating lists of identified Ukrainians to be killed or sent to camps following a military occupation.

There is substantial evidence that the overwhelming majority of those subjected to these abuses are civilians. Only nine of 226 individuals were accused of joining or claimed to have joined the armed resistance to Russia’s forces at the beginning of the war. If true, they may not be considered civilians under international law. However, everyone who has laid down arms or is considered “hors de combat,” including by merit of being in detention, is entitled to a minimum standard of treatment under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Common Article 3 protects detainees – whether civilian or otherwise – from torture, CIDT, and deaths in custody. Under Articles 43 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, civilians may only be interned “for imperative reasons of security,” and must be given the opportunity “to have such action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board.” While the process of apprehension and arrest is, by itself, not necessarily illegal, the allegations described herein demonstrates an extrajudicial system of detention that is a grave breach of minimum standards required by the Geneva Conventions, the ICCPR, and other instruments.

If confirmed by a qualified investigative body, the allegations in this report could represent violations of multiple instruments of international and regional human rights and humanitarian law. Allegations of torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (CIDT) could constitute violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), United Nations Convention

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5. Edward Wong, Julian E. Barnes, and Anton Troianovski, "U.S. Says Russia Has a List of Ukrainians to Kill or Detain after an Invasion," The New York Times, February 21, 2022, sec. World, https://perma.cc/YE4V-V39H. Link to the letter included in the NYT article: The New York Times, "Letter to High Commissioner Bachelet from Ambassador Crocker," accessed November 4, 2022, https://archive.ph/yEifO. Only one of the individuals in the data is allegedly LGBTQI+, and no information in any public accounts suggests that he was targeted or treated differently as a result. Other individuals in the dataset may be LGBTQI+ and may have been targeted for that reason, but it is not apparent in the open source material.


Against Torture (UNCAT), and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Pillage allegations from detainees, forcing them to record propaganda videos, enforced disappearance, and the detention of relatives all may violate the Fourth Geneva Convention. Enforced disappearance, also known as “forced disappearance” “is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.”

This report also documents twelve locations used for capture, interrogation, and detention. Nine are facilities where detention and interrogation have been conducted, and three are checkpoints where individuals have been captured and sometimes interrogated. Ten of these twelve locations are in Kherson oblast and two additional locations are in Crimea where at least twenty individuals captured in Kherson oblast were eventually brought for detention. Because this report addresses only detentions and disappearances in Kherson oblast, no other locations or incidents in Crimea are included. Due to the large number and constantly changing location of checkpoints, only the three for which Yale HRL found sufficient credible allegations of long-term use to reach high confidence were included. These represent a small sample of the dozens of checkpoints set up throughout Kherson oblast, on its administrative borders with other Russia-controlled areas, and on the border with Ukraine-controlled territory.

All sites described in this report were documented using open source data analysis and satellite imagery analysis of locations.

All individuals identified for this report who have been charged with a crime under Russia’s penal code have allegedly been brought to one of two locations in Crimea. Among the 226 individuals studied here, 15 were charged with a crime by Russia’s authorities and are currently awaiting trial, at trial, awaiting sentencing, or serving a criminal sentence. The alleged conditions of detention and allegations of the torture of at least 40% of those charged with a crime raise serious concerns about the possibility of due process rights of any individuals charged with a crime being ensured.

Russia’s forces completed withdrawal from the west side of the Dnipro River on 11 November, abandoning several of the locations documented in this report, including all in the city of Kherson. At the time of publication, it is not clear what Russia’s forces may have done with any individuals detained or disappeared at locations west of the Dnipro, whether released, transported, or killed.

Yale HRL’s database of 226 individual accounts of detention and disappearance in Kherson oblast does not include everyone disappeared or detained since the start of the invasion. Ukrainian sources, including government officials and human rights organizations, report that Kherson is one of the oblasts from which the greatest number of people have been detained or disappeared. While no definitive number of detained or disappeared persons can be established at present, human rights organizations have asserted that hundreds of people have disappeared in Kherson oblast since the full-scale invasion began.


10. Many checkpoints are temporary so an absolute number cannot be established. One man who fled Kherson in May claimed that there were “two dozen” on just the road from Kherson city to Melitopol. See: Tim Lister and Sanyo Fylyppov, "Days-Long Roadblocks, Missiles and ‘Lots of Blood’: Civilians Recall Terrifying Attempts to Escape Ukraine’s Cities as Russian Forces Tighten Grip," CNN, May 21, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/21/europe/kherson-ukraine-evacuations-russian-occupation-intl-cmd/index.html, https://perma.cc/82VG-3Z4Q.


12. Halya Coynash, "Abductions and Feared Mass Grave of Russian Invaders’ Victims in Liberated Vysokopillia (Kherson Oblast)," Kharkiv Human Rights Pro-
This report makes clear that Russia’s forces must be held accountable for the crimes they allegedly committed in Kherson oblast. While some individuals described here are known to have been released, many others remain in detention or are missing, their fates unknown to their families. Some of those held incommunicado may have died or been killed, as were the four people in this report known to have died in custody. Beyond accountability, a humanitarian response is also needed to identify missing persons, notify families about the status of loved ones, identify any human remains, and to provide psychosocial support to the individuals and families impacted by torture, detention, and enforced disappearance in Kherson oblast.

A. KEY FINDINGS

Main Findings
- Reports of detentions and disappearances of 226 individuals in Kherson oblast; the total number is likely significantly larger.
- Evidence consistent with an intentional campaign of detention and disappearance.
- Approximately one quarter of individuals allege torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
- Five people allegedly subject to torture died in custody or shortly after release.
- At least 17 people were detained or disappeared for a second time.
- Over half of those detained or disappeared do not appear to have been released.
- Most detentions and disappearances were allegedly conducted by Russia’s military and the FSB.
- About half were taken from home; Crimean Tatars were disproportionately detained or disappeared at checkpoints.

Demographic Patterns
- Crimean Tatars: 32 individuals allegedly detained or disappeared were identified as Crimean Tatars. Of all individuals charged with a crime, 60.0% were Crimean Tatars.
- Occupational patterns: The data set contains current or former government officials, including civil servants and politicians (60), civil society leaders or volunteers (33), educators (17), current or former law enforcement and security services (9), and journalists (7).
- Military age men: 87.6% of individuals were men and among those with known ages, 79.1% were men of military age.

Allegations of Torture & Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment

13. “Volunteer” (волонтер) is a term used in these accounts of detentions and disappearances to refer to various humanitarian and charitable activities, especially those undertaken in response to conditions created by the war and occupation. This includes distributing food or visiting and delivering supplies to the elderly. It does not refer to resistance activity, advocacy, or other political activity which, if present and relevant, is considered “resistance activity.” At least two of the individuals in this dataset allegedly used volunteer activity to hide their resistance activity (driving a bread truck to scout military positions, according to one of them), though Yale HRL has seen no information to suggest that this practice was widespread. The source of information (Source KDD001) has been withheld out of concern for the safety of its source. All subsequent sources that present a protection risk are marked “Source [Unique ID] withheld due to protection concerns.”

14. Law Enforcement and security services include police, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), and private security guards. It is difficult to distinguish those who stopped working in this field due to the occupation from those who stopped before, so all are included.

15. See footnote 1.
• Roulette, torture of relatives, sleep deprivation, sensory overload, and temperature manipulation.

• **Deaths in detention**: Five of the individuals in this dataset are known to have died while in detention or shortly after their release. All were allegedly subjected to torture.

• **Electronic surveillance and monitoring**: 24 (10.6%) had personal electronics taken, accessed, or monitored. The rate among Crimean Tatars was 19.0%.

• **Propaganda videos**: 12 were forced to record propaganda videos.

• **Sexual and gender-based violence**: 6 were subjected to or threatened with SGBV.

• **People held without charge**: Fifteen people had been charged with a crime by the time of publication; at least 40.0% of those charged with a crime allegedly experienced torture while in detention.

**Alleged Detention Sites**

• **High-confidence locations**: 12 locations that serve or have served as nodes for capture, interrogation or detention within the detention system were established with high confidence.

• **Detention locations in Kherson oblast**: Seven of these locations are detention and interrogation locations.

• **Checkpoints**: Three of these locations are checkpoints in Kherson oblast or on the border with Crimea.

• **Detention locations in Crimea**: Two are detention locations in Crimea to which people were brought from Kherson oblast. All individuals identified for this report who have been charged with a crime under a Russia-imposed legal system have allegedly been brought to one of these locations.

**B. METHODOLOGY**

This report combines open source data analysis of individual accounts of detentions and disappearances with open source and satellite imagery analysis of the detention locations implicated in those accounts. Yale HRL identified accounts of 226 individuals who are reported to have been detained or disappeared in Kherson oblast. Specific sources have been withheld out of concern for the safety of the subject or author and are identified in this report by code. In addition, Yale HRL has identified with high confidence 12 locations used for detention and interrogation in Kherson oblast and Crimea, three of which are checkpoints where individuals have been initially apprehended as well as interrogated. Due to the possible continued use of some facilities, no names, coordinates, or other identifiable information is published for specific locations.

This report reflects the analysis of three basic data streams. The first was the primary accounts and secondary reports of the detentions or disappearances of 226 individuals. Individuals were primarily identified through primary sources, such as the social media posts of family members, witnesses, or local news accounts. Additional data came from Ukrainian, Russian, and international media, Ukrainian and international human rights organizations, statements and publications of the Russian and Ukrainian governments, and leaked memos from Russia’s government actors. Because many individuals in this dataset cannot be safely contacted or remain in detention, Yale HRL makes no claims of confidence related to individual allegations or narratives collected here. Yale HRL has excluded the names, sources, and identifiable information related to all subjects of this report for security reasons but has detailed information on these 226 individuals for use by legal authorities in future investigations.

A second data stream consisted of primary accounts and secondary reports of the locations used in the detention system. Yale HRL observed the standards established by the Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations and required at least five independent sources corroborating a given location’s use as a detention facility and three accounts of individuals having been detained.
there to reach a determination of high confidence.\textsuperscript{16} Two locations in Crimea are included because multiple people in this data set were allegedly detained at each after being captured in Kherson oblast.

A third data source analyzed in this report is Very High Resolution (VHR) satellite imagery, which was used primarily in support of the second data stream related to locations. The VHR imagery used to support this investigation was commercially available, unclassified imagery captured by Maxar Technologies, Planet Labs PBC, and BlackSky Global, LLC. Given the limitations of satellite imagery to gather information on events occurring within buildings, this report primarily rests on extensive open source research, with satellite imagery used to verify any externally visible phenomena (see Appendix I for a list of observable indicators potentially consistent with activity related to extrajudicial detention and enforced disappearances in Kherson oblast) and illustrate the findings from open source material.

All open source materials in Ukrainian or Russian were initially translated by Google and then verified by a language expert. Throughout the report, Yale HRL uses the Ukrainian name of cities, towns, and villages according to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine.\textsuperscript{17} The spelling of place names can differ across Ukrainian and Russian, and a note is included where something may be unclear or require an explanation.

C. LEGAL ANALYSIS

This report documents allegations of abuses committed by Russia’s forces and its proxies, which could constitute violations of international law and Ukraine’s domestic law if verified. The Geneva Conventions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may all be implicated.

The forces most often described as being involved in the detentions and disappearances are Russia’s military (72.8%), the FSB (11.1%), the National Guard of Russia (2.1%) and Russia-backed proxy forces (2.5%). Election workers were involved in two cases (0.8%). No information about forces involved was available for approximately one-fifth of all captures.


Open source information indicates that these detentions and disappearances were planned before Russia's full-scale invasion began and these detentions and disappearances then escalated due to unexpected opposition to Russia's control. A memo allegedly leaked from the FSB, for example, describes the difficulty Russia faced in controlling the population of Kherson, but cautioned Russia's forces to scale back their use of terror as a means of control: “The terror has strengthened – there are no internal instruments to hold the situation inside the country. But terror is a complicated and expensive thing – it should become temporary. It’s like holding your breath because the air is poisoned: If you can escape the area, then the action is justified. But if you hold your breath for ‘an hour’ – you saved yourself from the poison but...”

This report offers information showing that detentions and disappearances – and the abuses that have allegedly accompanied them – are not local aberrations but part of an intentional effort with clear and discrete representation in Russia's chain of command. This report also explores the widespread allegations of target lists used by Russia's forces to identify, detain or disappear oblast residents.

D. LIMITATIONS

This report relies on information about 226 residents of Kherson oblast who were detained or disappeared. There is significant and unavoidable bias in the sample analyzed in this report because it reflects only what was available in open source information. Therefore, the dataset cannot be considered a representative random sample of those detained or disappeared. These limitations include bias towards survivors, bias towards released detainees, bias towards those willing to share their experience, and bias towards those detained with more witnesses present.

Yale HRL establishes credible allegations in this report based on the aggregation of multiple

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independent accounts. Yale HRL does not establish with high confidence the veracity of a single account or narrative of detention or disappearance. However, these reports are made credible by their diverse provenance and consistent and related claims. Throughout this report Yale HRL endeavors to provide the number of sources or narratives that contribute to a claim. For example, while Yale HRL will not claim to prove with a high level of confidence that a particular detainee was tortured by electric shock, Yale HRL will assert that the use of that technique was described in the independent accounts of four detentions, or that at least four current or former detainees have alleged that they were subject to electric shock.

II. DETAILED FINDINGS

A. RUSSIA’S PREMEDITATED CAMPAIGN OF DETENTION & DISAPPEARANCE IN KHERSON OBLAST

Credible reports from the Ukrainian and United States governments, as well as accounts from individuals in Kherson oblast, indicate that Russia’s forces organized and planned the system of forced disappearances and extrajudicial detention before the February 2022 invasion began. A letter sent by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva, Ambassador Bathsheba Crocker, to former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michele Bachelet just prior to the invasion cited...

credible information that indicates Russia's forces are creating lists of identified Ukrainians to be killed or sent to camps following a military occupation. We also have credible information that Russia's forces will likely use lethal measures to disperse peaceful protests or otherwise counter peaceful exercises of perceived resistance from civilian populations.” All these measures are documented in this report. The letter further states that “[t]hese acts...would likely target those who oppose Russian actions, including Russian and Belarusian dissidents in exile in Ukraine, journalists and anti-corruption activists, and vulnerable populations such as religious and ethnic minorities and LGBTQI+ persons.”

Multiple sources included in this report refer to lists of targeted individuals – created either before the invasion or based on alleged activity thereafter – who were systematically targeted by Russia’s forces. For example, a Ukrainian politician from Kherson oblast claimed the following:

They have lists of ATO officers, ...people who served in law enforcement agencies, and are now retired. They work on these people.... They take away people, activists, who were seen at rallies. They have a good apparatus, with the help of which they photograph active participants, digitize this data, establish their place of residence, and then come to the address and pick them up.


A local official in Kherson oblast claimed in April that 200 residents of his city had already been detained due to their presence on lists. This official spoke of general “anxiety” because Russia's security forces “always have lists on hand with names and license-plate numbers, which leads to searches.” Another man whose relative was detained claimed that officers had lists of targets on a tablet; the lists supposedly included the town’s “soldiers, police officers, emergency services,” and veterans of the Soviet War in Afghanistan. These lists allegedly included full names, residential addresses, license plate numbers, and details about service in the military or police. One person remarked that “[i]t was a planned purge of the population, they took everyone who could in any way resist.”

Ukrainian officials have also alleged the existence of these lists and claim they include veterans of the fighting in Donbas, law enforcement and security services, and Crimean Tatars. The representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, a Ukraine government official, claimed that Russia’s forces are intentionally targeting Kherson oblast areas where Crimean Tatars live: “Now the FSB and various law enforcement agencies are already working there. They come to the houses of the Crimean Tatars with some lists and say that they know they are related to the Mejlis [the Crimean Tatar representative body banned by Russia since 2016], to the civil blockade of Crimea, or served in the ATO.” Finally, school principals were allegedly forced to provide lists of teachers and information about whether they had agreed to cooperate with the occupation, and apartment managers were made to provide lists of tenants.

Leaked documents obtained by The Times of London in March 2022 suggest that the detentions and forced disappearances documented in this report represent a deliberate and premeditated strategy for pacifying the population of Kherson. The documents – leaked FSB memos which the Times considers credible but which Yale HRL has not been able to authenticate – suggest that a deliberate campaign of “great terror” towards the civilian population would multiply the impact of limited force available for controlling population centers. The memo claims that the occupation authorities' strategy was first to stop protests using disproportionate force (“extremely strict methods of dispersal” designed to inflict “severe injury”), followed by a campaign of door-to-door arrests: “Even if we have to deport as many as half the city – we are ready for that.” The whistleblower who leaked these documents claimed that the order for this “great terror” came from “the very top.”

proxy war in Donbas in eastern Ukraine. After ATO, the Joint Forces Operation was introduced until Russia’s full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022. In Ukraine, “ATO” is sometimes used as a catch-all term for the entire war in Donbas from 2014-2022. Where “ATO” appears in a source or direct quote in this report, there is often not enough context to know if the speaker was referring specifically to the ATO measures or is using it as a general term for the war in Donbas.

22. Source KDD003; withheld due to protection concerns.
23. Source KDD004; withheld due to protection concerns.
24. Source KDD004; withheld due to protection concerns.
25. Source KDD005; withheld due to protection concerns.
In September 2022 the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) announced that it had charged a Russian police colonel with ordering the illegal detention and torture of Ukrainian citizens, pillaging of their property, and violently dispersing protests in occupied Kherson. According to the SBU, the man commanded all National Guard units and militias in Kherson. At least five of the cases examined in this report include claims of arrest by National Guardsmen.

Documents found in previously Russia-controlled Kharkiv oblast describe the command structure for civilian population control there. One officer had the specific responsibility of maintaining control over the local civilian population and managing at least one interrogation facility in which beatings, torture, and rape were witnessed. Similar documents have not yet been uncovered in Kherson oblast, yet those from Kharkiv suggest that the activity documented in this report does not reflect the rogue action of local forces but is integrated into Russia's chain of command.

Despite the apparent intentionality and alleged premeditation of these detentions and disappearances, conditions individuals experienced before and during detention struck many subjects and witnesses as random, capricious, and disorderly. Several individuals claim they were offered enlistment in Russia-backed forces immediately after being tortured by those same forces. One detainee’s family member claimed that Russia's soldiers came for their relative several days after another group of soldiers had detained him, not realizing that he was already in Russia's custody. Nonetheless, while some elements of the system may appear to be or are indeed random or poorly executed, when taken as a whole the system appears premeditated and designed.

B. TRENDS: DETENTIONS AND DISAPPEARANCES IN KHERSON OBLAST

There are identifiable trends across individuals’ disappearances and detentions in Kherson oblast. This section will discuss trends related to social and demographic information about targeted individuals. It also addresses the spatial and temporal trends in these detentions and disappearances, information about the Russia-aligned forces engaged in detention and disappearances, surveillance and data reportedly collected, and reports of coercion and forced propaganda. The numerous allegations of torture, CIDT, and other alleged violations of international law will be discussed in the following section.

This report relies on information from or about 226 individuals detained or disappeared in Kherson oblast. Establishing high confidence in individuals’ experiences was not possible within this investigation’s scope at this time. However, the aggregate of these accounts and the specific allegations made by numerous people constitute credible allegations. The conclusions of this report are limited by the fact that the accounts of the 226 individuals represented in this report are subject to significant reporting, survivorship, and release biases. Much remains as yet inconclusive about the individual experiences represented in this dataset because less than half the persons are known to have been released. The reports of the 226 individuals in this report should not be assumed to represent a random sample of those detained or disappeared in Kherson oblast.


32. Source KDD030; withheld due to protection concerns.

33. Source KDD006; withheld due to protection concerns.
1. SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERNS CONSISTENT WITH ALLEGED TARGETING

The accounts in this report demonstrate a system of targeted detentions and forced disappearances distinct from a population-wide filtration effort. These accounts are marked by allegations of intentional targeting of individuals, including multiple allegations of the existence of target lists. The occupations and professional experience, social status, and ethno-religious affiliation of the individuals in this dataset are consistent with the targeting alleged before the invasion. Figure 2 below illustrates the most common occupation among those who were detained or disappeared. Seventeen individuals were detained for a second time.

The individuals in this dataset are overwhelmingly male: 87.6% are men. Among all those with known ages, over three quarters (79.1%) are men of military age (between 18 and 60 years old; it is unlikely that all would be eligible for service in Ukraine’s military due to medical, professional, family, or other exceptions).³⁴

![Figure 2: Occupations of detained and disappeared individuals. The occupations of all individuals detained or disappeared is shown at left, with the 17 individuals also detained a second time shown on the right (individuals may hold multiple occupations).](image)

³⁴. See footnote 1. Ages are only known for 153 individuals.
At least two individuals in this dataset allegedly used volunteer activity to hide resistance activity (driving a bread truck to scout military positions, according to one of them), though Yale HRL has seen no information to suggest that this practice was widespread.

**Educators:** Seventeen educators were among those detained or disappeared, representing 7.5% of individuals in the dataset. Twelve of the seventeen educators (70.6%) were released after being detained. Two of the educators were captured for a second time in September 2022, one of whom was released roughly three weeks after their second detention. At least three of the educators were allegedly detained or disappeared as a consequence of denunciations made against them by coworkers or professional rivals. Several teachers were allegedly detained or disappeared for refusing to teach Russia’s dictated curriculum or language. At least one educator was appointed to lead his town’s education department and began to teach the Russia-dictated curriculum following his release from detention.

**Journalists:** Seven of the individuals in this dataset were identified as journalists, representing 3.1% of individuals. Among these journalists, six were captured by Russia’s military forces and six were released within two weeks of their initial detention. One journalist had not been released at the time of publication. Several journalists were either offered jobs with the occupation authority or threatened with punishment if they did not write pro-occupation articles upon their release.

**Religious Leaders:** Three religious leaders were captured, including one Crimean Tatar religious leader and two Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) priests. Both UOC priests were released within one week of capture. The Crimean Tatar leader, who was also detained for his alleged involvement with the Noman Çelebicihan Battalion, was charged with participation in an illegal armed formation. He had not yet been released from detention at the time of publication.

2. **ALLEGED OPPOSITION TO RUSSIA’S CONTROL OF KHERSON OBLAST**

Forty-five (19.9%) individuals included in this data set were either engaged in or were accused of engaging in “resistance to the occupation.” Their activities allegedly ranged from blogging to refusing to teach the Russia-imposed school curriculum to passing information on Russia’s activity to Ukraine. In one case members of the family of a civil servant who helped him hide sensitive data from Russia’s forces were themselves detained. At least nine of the individuals in this dataset had

35. Sources KDD0007, KDD0008, KDD0009; withheld due to protection concerns.

36. Source KDD010; withheld due to protection concerns.

37. Source KDD011; withheld due to protection concerns.

38. Source KDD012; withheld due to protection concerns.

39. The Noman Çelebicihan Battalion is an organization composed of Crimean Tatars in Kherson oblast who were involved in the brief efforts to blockade Crimea in 2015 following Russia’s illegal annexation the year before. The Supreme Court of Russia declared the group a terrorist organization on 1 June 2022 and Crimean Tatars charged since then have been accused of membership in 2015 and 2016. Yale HRL has been unable to identify a single other country that has listed the organization as a terrorist group (it did not appear on any international lists and is also absent from the lists of other members of the Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States). Halya Coynash, “Crimean Tatar Sentenced to 6 Years for Involvement in Legal Ukrainian Organization,” Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, March 24, 2021, [https://khp.org/ru/1608808918](https://khp.org/ru/1608808918); [https://perma.cc/XSX8-Z2TP](https://perma.cc/XSX8-Z2TP). “Единый федеральный список организаций, в том числе иностранных и международных организаций, признанных в соответствии с законодательством Российской Федерации террористическими,” Федеральная служба безопасности Российской Федерации, accessed November 7, 2022, [http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/npd/terror.htm](http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/npd/terror.htm); [https://archive.ph/tGNo8](https://archive.ph/tGNo8). “Список террористических и экстремистских организаций,” Антитеррористический центр государств — участников Содружества Независимых Государств, Accessed November 7, 2022, [https://www.cisatc.org/1289/134/160](https://www.cisatc.org/1289/134/160); [https://archive.ph/MnsRr](https://archive.ph/MnsRr).

40. Source KDD013; withheld due to protection concerns.

41. Source KDD014, withheld due to protection concerns.
been Territorial Defense Force volunteers or leaders during the brief period before Russia’s forces took the city of Kherson on 2 March 2022. Most claimed to have laid down arms once fighting ended, though at least two allegedly continued scouting for Ukraine under the guise of distributing humanitarian aid (according to one of the individuals previously detained). Russia’s forces captured at least three former members of the Territorial Defense Force and the wife of one on the same day, allegedly by using information from another member already in their custody. Some accounts of detentions and disappearances suggest that the threshold for activity considered “resisting the occupation” was very low: some civilians were allegedly threatened with imprisonment “in the basement” (a widely-used allusion to several interrogation and torture locations) for failure to clean their neighborhood and whitewash street curbs in advance of the annual May 9 Victory Day celebration.

At least 13 individuals in this dataset allegedly attended protests against Russia’s control in the weeks after Russia’s forces entered cities in Kherson oblast, according to them or their interlocutors. An alleged leaked FSB memo described by The Times of London in a March 2022 article claimed that Russia’s forces in Kherson struggled to suppress protests in Kherson city after capturing it:

If it were possible to identify protest leaders, they would have been liquidated already…. Protesters are saved only by the fact that it is unclear who exactly needs to be captured. There are also fears that a move to violence may end in a real riot, which could only be suppressed by large-scale fighting.

Interrogation accounts collected by Yale HRL, as well as news articles about disappearances, point to efforts by Russia-aligned forces to identify the “organizations” of these protests, which attendees claim were spontaneous. Russia’s forces also allegedly tried to entrap civilians by posing as anti-occupation activists on social media and asking for information about military positions. In one case, Russia’s forces used the phone of a detainee’s child to try to elicit information from neighbors about the location of another person they wanted to detain. The message was allegedly posted to a local social media group during a search of the detainee’s house.

3. FORCES ALLEGEDLY ENGAGED IN DETENTION & DISAPPEARANCE

Subjects of or witnesses to detentions and disappearances identified the forces involved in roughly 80% of cases in this dataset. Members of Russia’s Armed Forces were allegedly involved in 177 (72.8%) detention or disappearances (including those conducted by unknown forces). Subjects or witnesses claimed FSB agent involvement in 27 (11.1%) detentions and disappearances. Russia’s National Guard and Russia-backed proxy forces were each allegedly involved in at least 5 (2.1%) and 6 (2.5%) of cases, respectively. Approximately one-fifth of detentions and disappearances did not have information available regarding organizations involved in apprehension.

42. Sources KDD015, KDD016; withheld due to protection concerns.
44. Source KDD017; withheld due to protection concerns.
46. Source KDD018; withheld due to protection concerns.
47. Proportions presented here may undercount any non-uniformed organizations involved; organizations wearing plain clothes and not identifying themselves are less likely to have been named in these accounts. Some witnesses may have also conflated members of Russia’s Armed Forces and uniformed members of Russia’s National Guard and the Border Service of the FSB. Additionally, the election workers involved in apprehension were present when apprehensions occurred related to individuals refusing to participate in Russia’s annexation referendum.

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4. TRENDS AND PATTERNS OF DETENTION AND TREATMENT

a) Dates and locations of detentions and disappearances

The first confirmed detentions and disappearances included in the Yale HRL dataset occurred on 4 March 2022. April saw the highest number of detentions and disappearances, with 55 incidents occurring throughout the month. Detentions and disappearances occurred in every month analyzed. Apprehensions and arrests have also been reported across the geographic extent of the oblast, including in urban and rural areas. While detentions and disappearances occurred throughout Kherson oblast, Yale HRL was unable to detect a trend between number of incidents and location.

Alleged detentions and disappearances in Kherson oblast since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022

![Bar chart showing weekly detentions and disappearances](image)

Figure 3: Weekly detentions and disappearances throughout Kherson oblast, March-October 2022.
Figure 4: Number of captures by territorial community. Captures that occurred at unknown locations are not shown.

\( b) \) Forced electronic and biometric data collection and surveillance

A significant number of reports allege the confiscation and monitoring of individuals’ personal electronic devices, with concerning reports of family members of detainees and witnesses also having their personal devices searched or taken. No element of this surveillance appears to be de facto illegal. However, these apparent surveillance activities are of grave concern when viewed in the context of a broader system of extrajudicial detention and enforced disappearance. Pillage (below) is also a violation of the Geneva Convention IV Article 33.

At least 24 of 226 accounts examined in this report involve the monitoring or confiscation of victims' electronic devices (including laptops, phones, and hard drives). Crimean Tatars had their electronics confiscated at higher rates than did the non-Crimean Tatar population in this sample. Roughly 18.8% of detained or disappeared Crimean Tatars are known to have had their electronics accessed compared to approximately 9.3% of non-Crimean Tatar individuals. Both numbers likely represent a severe undercount, as the underlying data is not based on a survey and some accounts may not include phenomena that nonetheless occurred. Information is also not available on many people who had not been released as of publication.

One man who was severely beaten at a protest in the spring of 2022 was arrested after leaving a hospital hours later with broken bones. On his return home, Russia’s forces arrested
him and took his hard drives, CCTV footage, and cell phones. The wife of another detainee alleges that Russia's soldiers searched her mobile phone and asked questions about calls she made to Ukraine's Commissioner for Human Rights when she began to suspect that her husband had been captured. Others reported that their personal and family documents were seized or photographed during their arrest or during subsequent raids. The mother of one disappeared young man saw all his social media accounts occasionally come “online,” and though messages she sent to her son were marked “read,” he never responded. While another man was being detained, a witness began recording on his phone, but Russia's forces beat the witness and took his phone.

There are reports that Russia's forces used detainees' phones while they were in captivity. The mother of one young man detained at the border with Crimea saw his social media profiles marked “online” at ten day intervals during the summer. This man's device's location tracker showed it at a detention location where released detainees claimed their phones were turned on and used during interrogation. Contacts of a detained woman claimed they received messages from her phone during her detention that appeared aimed at luring them into a trap. Russia's forces at times also communicated directly with the family or representatives of detainees. The office of former Ukrainian Ombudswoman for Human Rights Lyudmila Denisova was told by the person who answered a detained politician's phone that he had returned home, while he was in fact still in custody and possibly in Crimea. Some families of missing persons have even communicated with people they believe were their relative's captors. One detained man's mother only learned of his whereabouts when a person accusing him of “committing crimes against Russian troops” responded to a message she sent her son, suggesting that his captors were monitoring his device and responding to messages.

According to the Media Initiative for Human Rights, a Ukrainian human rights organization, Russia's forces transfer data from the phones of detained and disappeared individuals to a central server in Kherson, from which those forces communicate with relatives. Yale HRL has not independently verified the allegation regarding the central server; however, the allegation of a central database of residents' information is alleged in multiple other accounts. One man who was interrogated but not detained at a checkpoint on the border with Crimea says that his interrogators identified the phone numbers of “alleged SBU agents” on his phone, despite the numbers being associated with innocuous names (the man claims that he did not know these individuals nor their affiliation with the SBU, and that the contacts had only been on his phone because of a syncing problem with a friend's phone).

48. Source KDD019; withheld due to protection concerns.
49. Source KDD016; withheld due to protection concerns.
50. Source KDD020; withheld due to protection concerns.
51. Source KDD021; withheld due to protection concerns.
52. Source KDD024; withheld due to protection concerns.
53. Source KDD025; withheld due to protection concerns.
54. Source KDD026; withheld due to protection concerns.
55. Source KDD021; withheld due to protection concerns.
57. Source KDD022; withheld due to protection concerns.
At least five individuals in this dataset described having biometric data, including DNA, taken from them while detained. One man claimed that a DNA swab and fingerprints were taken under the thin disguise of a test for COVID-19. Another described how the group of detainees he was traveling with were fingerprinted and had their DNA collected upon arrival to a detention facility in Crimea.

c) Efforts to elicit cooperation
Many of the 60 government officials and 17 educators included in this dataset were subjected to efforts to convince them to collaborate with occupying forces upon their release from detention. While only two of the detentions profiled here are alleged to have explicitly led to collaboration with Russia’s forces and its proxies, many people changed behavior due to detention in other ways. Two detainees subsequently left the country, two resigned their positions, and at least 15 left their place of residence, of whom some continued their work remotely. It is possible that some released detainees have cooperated with Russia’s and proxy authorities but have not publicly stated doing so. Finally, many others remain in custody, and have thus been removed from their social or government roles. Yale HRL also documented multiple reports of individuals being forced to record videos echoing Russia’s propaganda, a phenomenon which will be discussed in detail below.

C. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Cases included in this dataset include a significant number of accounts and reports of alleged violations of international law, including torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (CIDT). At least 4 individuals allegedly died while in custody, with one additional death reported shortly after release from detention. The sum of accounts documented here, as well as the large number of alleged abuses and possible violations of humanitarian and human rights law, demonstrate the widespread nature of these concerning trends. Furthermore, because this dataset only includes information available in the public record, incidents are likely undercounted. Yale HRL was able to collect data on these reports only if the subject or a witness claimed they experienced conditions which may violate international law. This means that Yale HRL was not able to collect data related to alleged violations of international law for those not yet known to be released, or for released individuals who did not give interviews about the conditions of their detention.

Under the Geneva Conventions, any abuses committed by Russia’s forces are Russia’s responsibility: “The Party to the conflict in whose hands protected persons may be, is responsible for the treatment accorded to them by its agents, irrespective of any individual responsibility which may be incurred.”

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58. Source KDD023; withheld due to protection concerns.

59. Source KDD001; withheld due to protection concerns.

60. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, “What distinguishes torture from other forms of ill-treatment, which include other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and outrages upon personal dignity, is the [purposive aspect]. Inhuman and cruel treatment is defined as the infliction of severe physical or mental pain or suffering, which goes beyond mere degradation or humiliation. Outrages upon personal dignity are acts that humiliate, degrade or otherwise violate the dignity of the person to such a degree as to be generally recognized as an outrage upon personal dignity. Unlike torture, there is no requirement that these acts be inflicted for a specific purpose.” See: ICRC, “Prohibition and punishment of torture and other forms of ill-treatment,” June 25, 2014, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/prohibition-and-punishment-torture-and-other-forms-ill-treatment, https://perma.cc/6J6W-CWF6.

61. Source KDD027; withheld due to protection concerns.

Table 1: Alleged violations of international law related to disappearances and detentions in Kherson oblast. (*Neither Russia nor Ukraine is a state party to the Rome Statute, though Ukraine has accepted the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction since 2014.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALLEGED VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW</th>
<th>MINIMUM NUMBER OF ACCOUNTS</th>
<th>RELEVANT LEGAL NORM</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Torture or Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment</td>
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<td>UNCAT, Article 1</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>UDHR, Article 5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ICCPR, Article 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pillage from Detainees</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Geneva Convention IV, Article 33</td>
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<td>Sexual and Gender-based Violence</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enforced Disappearance</td>
<td>See section II.C.7</td>
<td>Rome Statute, Article 7(1)(i)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Geneva Convention IV, Article 136</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ICCPR, Article 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR DETENTION OF CIVILIANS IN A WAR ZONE AND ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES

Activity allegedly conducted by Russia's forces in Kherson oblast may violate international humanitarian and human rights law, including multiple specific instruments to which Russia is party. Russia has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its first Optional Protocol, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT), and Geneva Conventions I-IV and Additional Protocol II. Russia is also party to multiple regional instruments including the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Cases reviewed for this report include

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63. Only the most salient norms are provided here. Detailed analysis continues in this section titled “Alleged Violations of International Law.”


allegations that, if verified by an appropriate investigative body, may constitute a range of violations of international law, treaty law, and customary human rights law. The human rights law and humanitarian law governing the detention of civilians during war time is explored briefly below.

Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that “All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.” Article 9 of the ICCPR guarantees specific due process rights that preclude arbitrary arrest, including: informing the subject of the reason for their arrest; a prompt initial hearing on detention and a trial within a reasonable period; and other due process procedural rights. “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law.” While Article 9 of the ICCPR is derogable in times of public emergency, certain limits exist. Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, civilians may be detained without charge during times of war, “only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.” Such non-criminal detentions are only allowed under the Geneva Conventions in certain circumstances. Article 43 of the Fourth Geneva Convention requires that any decisions to detain civilians must be made subject to review by a judicial or administrative board appointed by the detaining power at the request of the internee. Internees must also be housed in facilities that are not harmful to their health or hygiene, and must be provided with sufficient food, water, soap, clothing, and medicine.

The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance defines an enforced disappearance as “the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.” In many cases Yale HRL is not in a position to conclude whether a given case meets this definition (for example, unless an individual’s relative specifically describes not having received information from or about their family member in an open source, it is possible that they know their family member’s whereabouts but simply haven’t written publicly about it). However, many of the cases identified would likely meet this definition of enforced disappearance if established as fact by an appropriate investigative body.

2. ALLEGED TORTURE AND CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT

At least 55 of the individual reports of detention or disappearance include allegations of treatment that could constitute torture under international law if verified. Many other cases involve claims of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment that, if confirmed, could also constitute violations of international law. Figure 5 shows the methods of torture allegedly inflicted on those who were detained or disappeared.


67. Ibid.


69. Ibid.


71. Not all these accounts use the word “torture” ("катування"). Many describe acts or conditions that constitute torture under international law, without using the word.
The prohibition against torture is a peremptory norm of international law and is also banned under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT), and the ICCPR. Neither Article 7 of the ICCPR prohibiting torture nor UNCAT may be derogated under any circumstances.

Among the acts reported by witnesses that may rise to the level of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment are sexual violence, threats of sexual violence, beatings, torture of family in front of the subject, mock execution, strangulation, stress positions, sensory overload, beatings, and the application of electric shock. While 24.3% of cases allege torture or treatment that can constitute torture, the number of individuals in this data set who experienced torture or CIDT is likely far higher. A majority (58.8%) of the 55 individuals in this dataset for whom there are allegations of torture have been released, suggesting that there may be many more instances of torture among those who were disappeared or remain in detention. For many people who were never released there is no public information about the conditions of their detention or even whether they are alive. Likewise, there have been reports from Kherson oblast and the rest of occupied Ukraine of deaths from torture in Russia’s custody, a fate which may have befallen some of those for whom there is no public information about their release.

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The torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment documented in this report do not follow a single pattern or strategy. In some cases, the torture appears to have been deliberate and orchestrated by forces familiar with traditional tactics. For example, some stated that stress positions and psychophysiological tactics were far more effective than the brute violence:

Handcuffs behind the back, legs tied, a bag on your head. Constant psychological pressure. Sometimes they put you on your knees and shoot to scare you. Firecrackers explode. They beat you constantly. A telephone operator arrives with a switchboard. They torture with electric current. Legs, shoulders, back, kidneys – they beat everything. You are tied up all the time and cannot move. This is how they prepare you for a conversation. The first time, no matter what you answer, they say: don’t lie, and continue to beat you. 

Individuals and witnesses report that torture seemed aimed at eliciting some type of response from them; others allege that their experiences of torture seemed arbitrary and with no clear goal.

Several individuals reported being tortured for information about the position of Ukraine’s military units, especially at the beginning of Russia’s control of Kherson oblast. Others were asked about the leadership of protest movements or opposition groups. Some were also tortured into confessing real or contrived crimes, or activity considered hostile to Russia’s control. Among those criminally charged, at least 40% were allegedly tortured while detained. Even the threat of torture may taint evidence and raises questions about due process and detainees’ ability to receive a fair trial. 

At other times, victims say they did not understand the tactics being employed or the information desired. Several of the formerly detained people included in this report expressed confusion at their treatment, as it did not seem strategically motivated to them. One man was tortured for days in a basement and subjected to mock execution, before being propositioned for service in Russia’s military: “I cannot make sense of any of it… I was arrested trying to repair a window, next I was given mock executions and saw captured soldiers tortured and horribly killed by men with blunt bayonets arguing about socks. Later they tried to get me to join their army. There was no logic I can explain. If there had been, they would have killed me too.” The same man added “[t]here was never even a pattern to the Russians’ interrogation – it was as if they were out of their minds, just shouting, beating, and torturing.”

75. Source KDD028; withheld due to protection concerns.
76. Source KDD029; withheld due to protection concerns.
78. Source KDD030; withheld due to protection concerns.
79. Ibid.
Specific tactics and conditions described in accounts include:

**Beating:** Some 40 (17.7%) of the profiles considered in this analysis claim the use of beatings at some point, either during arrest, transport, interrogation, or at random times during a detention or disappearance. Beatings allegedly ranged from those clearly designed to elicit information or to change behavior to those that appeared to lack an objective other than punishment. Beatings were also common in these accounts during initial capture and transportation to detention facilities. In several cases, beatings allegedly led to broken bones and, in at least one case, was determined to be the cause of a detainee's death.  

**Electric shock:** At least six of the cases examined in this report describe the use of electric shocks as an instrument of torture. In several of these cases, victims described being doused in water and having electrodes connected to their toes and fingers. Some describe it as the most painful part of torture, while others say that they were already too delirious to feel anything. One victim who was subjected to torture by electric shock, among other things, died about two weeks after his release. He had had a pacemaker while subjected to electric shock.

**Sleep deprivation, stress positions, sensory overload, and temperature manipulation:** Several of the detentions and disappearances examined in this report experienced psychophysiological torture while in Russia's custody. Some, for example, described being handcuffed overnight to a radiator in the same detention facility. By some accounts the cold, prolonged stress position and lack of sleep had their intended effect:

> Then he hit me across the jaw several more times and hit my neck with the edge of his palm. The blows were not very strong. More to scare me. But I was in a lot of pain, because I had not slept the night before, handcuffed to the radiator. My head hurt terribly. In general, in three days in captivity I suffered so much that I thought: my brain can't take it. The pressure was insane, the whole body scratched, itched, the headache was unbearable.

Article 85 of the Fourth Geneva Convention requires that all protected persons must be held in environments that "provide efficient protection against the rigours of the climate." As with other elements of Article 85, these conditions must be established immediately for civilian detainees.

**Detention, threats, and torture of family:** There are multiple allegations of detention, threats, and torture of family members of detained or disappeared individuals that appear to be connected to a single initial detention. In several such cases, family and witnesses have alleged that these detentions and disappearances were unrelated to the identity or activity of the relatives, but rather seemed to be a means of pressuring or retaliating against a primary target. One man who had fought in the Territorial Defense Forces before Kherson oblast was occupied was detained along with his wife and son. His wife was made to listen while her husband was first severely beaten in their basement, then beaten at a police station: "Then they took my husband to the basement, where there were weapons, and began to beat him so that the walls began to tremble. When [he]

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80. Source KDD001; withheld due to protection concerns.
81. Source KDD031; withheld due to protection concerns.
82. Source KDD032; withheld due to protection concerns.
83. Source KDD033; withheld due to protection concerns.
was taken upstairs, the bones of his face were broken, he could hardly even sit and moan in pain.\textsuperscript{85} It is not clear whether this tactic succeeded in eliciting a confession; Russia’s authorities claim that the man confessed to being a “terrorist” and was taken to Crimea for trial, but his body was later found weighted down in the Dnipro River in the city of Kherson.\textsuperscript{86} There are other accounts of death threats being used to ensure individuals “behaved” while in detention; one man reported that individuals in overcrowded facilities were told they would be killed if caught communicating with each other.\textsuperscript{87}

Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, the use of “physical or moral coercion” may not be “exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties.” UNCAT likewise specifically includes third parties in its definition of torture:

\begin{quote}
[T]he term “torture” means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.\textsuperscript{88}
\end{quote}

Mock execution and Russian roulette: Several of the cases documented in this report involve allegations of mock executions or the real “playing” of Russian roulette with detained people. For example, Russia’s forces played Russian roulette with several men arrested at a protest in Kherson oblast in the spring, in between beatings.\textsuperscript{89} Another man described his experience in detention saying,

Two people came in, they didn’t ask anything, they beat and left. Then they played Russian roulette. One pulled out a revolver and he took out cartridges: one he put in front of you, the others in his pockets. Then he loaded one cartridge. I realized for the third time, that when he loads [the gun], the other one beats you. I dodge, and at that moment the cartridge is already in the drum. He spins it directly at you, and then clicks, and shoots. Oh, he says, you are lucky, and they leave.\textsuperscript{90}

Others were subjected to mock executions. A journalist detained for several days reported witnessing the mock execution of a young man held at the same location.\textsuperscript{91} Another man kept in a basement was brought out to a courtyard three times and subjected to mock execution, a threat made even more real as he had just witnessed the execution of several recently captured Ukrainian prisoners of war.\textsuperscript{92}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{85}{Source KDD034; withheld due to protection concerns.}
\footnotetext{86}{Source KDD035; withheld due to protection concerns.}
\footnotetext{87}{Source KDD036; withheld due to protection concerns.}
\footnotetext{89}{Source KDD017; withheld due to protection concerns.}
\footnotetext{90}{Source KDD038; withheld due to protection concerns.}
\footnotetext{91}{Source KDD037; withheld due to protection concerns.}
\footnotetext{92}{Source KDD030; withheld due to protection concerns. The executed POWs are not included in this dataset as they are beyond its scope.}
\end{footnotes}
Death from torture: Five cases examined here include allegations of deaths of individuals during or shortly after undergoing torture. Yale HRL is not able to assess whether any of these individuals died during torture nor to assert with confidence a causal relationship between the torture and their deaths. Instead, Yale HRL has collected all available information about the co-incidence.

One former Territorial Defense Force (TDF) member who laid down arms after Kherson was occupied was captured and allegedly died from the torture he endured in Kherson. Another TDF member who was tortured alongside him but later released in a prisoner exchange said:

They just started hitting me in the face. They hit me three times and they were angry that I didn’t fall from the first two... They lifted [my cellmate] and similarly hit him several times. He fell down, they took off his pants and started beating his thighs with sticks, turning them blue... Roughly speaking, they prepare you for a conversation – for the first few hours they beat you up, suffocate you with bags, torture you with electric shock, prevent you from breathing, and at the same time constantly beat you... [My cellmate] did not lie down once in 22 days. This was not possible due to his punctured rib cage. He was not given help... He suffered like this for two weeks. We asked to get him some kind of medical help, but they refused and said that if he doesn’t want to talk, then let him stay like that.94

The two men were transferred to a pre-trial detention facility in Crimea, where the injured man was finally taken to the hospital, 24 days after his lung was punctured. He died just four days later, from what a medical examiner in Kherson determined was “blunt trauma to the chest with fractured ribs.”95 It appears that no medical care was made available at his initial place of detention, in violation of Article 91 of the Fourth Geneva Convention if verified.96

Another man who was allegedly tortured in detention returned bearing bruises on his face, a piece of his lip missing. The man – who had a pacemaker because of two previous heart attacks – told his children that he had been repeatedly electrocuted and then revived when he lost consciousness. The man's health declined precipitously after his return, and he died two weeks later.97

Denial of medical care: At least three of the cases documented here involve allegations of medical care being denied to detainees. Some people were brought home to gather medicine before or during their detention, while others were not.98 One man allegedly had a heart attack while being detained, after which he was brought to and kept in a hospital under military escort.99 Another, who suffered from chronic bronchitis, only received treatment when his family provided medicine to his captors. His lawyers also claimed that “the man is experiencing pain in the liver, but the infirmary therapist has been ignoring his claims for about 2 weeks.”100

93. Source KDD015; withheld due to protection concerns. Regardless of his civilian status, the man would have been protected under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
94. Source KDD001; withheld due to protection concerns.
95. Source KDD001; withheld due to protection concerns.
97. Source KDD027; withheld due to protection concerns.
98. Source KDD040; withheld due to protection concerns.
99. Source KDD039; withheld due to protection concerns.
100. Source KDD041; withheld due to protection concerns.
Other detainees were allegedly given medical care meant to offset the effects of their torture; one man who had been tortured with electric shocks and complained about heart problems was given Corvalol (a heart medication and mild tranquilizer popular in Eastern Europe). Another man who allegedly died from injuries sustained during his torture was not given medical care for over three weeks despite allegedly clear signs of need (full details in the section *Death from torture* above).

Article 91 of the Fourth Geneva Convention mandates that civilian internees be provided adequate medical care.

**Insufficient food and water:** At least six of the cases in this data set describe detainees being denied sufficient food and/or water. A veteran tortured for several weeks in the basement of a police building claimed, “There was food – in the morning there was boiling water and two galette biscuits. The same for dinner, only we were given one more bag of tea for 5 people. And at lunch they gave two 180-gram jars of porridge for five.” The wife of another detainee said her husband had “lost a lot of weight” having seen him in a propaganda video he was forced to record while in custody. If confirmed, any denial of food “sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to keep internees in a good state of health” would represent a violation of Article 89 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

**Overcrowding:** At least three of the cases in Yale HRL’s dataset describe conditions of overcrowding in detention facilities. In one case a man was held for four days in a six meters (20 feet) long shipping container with 16 other men while they were alternately taken out for interrogation and torture. Another detainee was allegedly held in similar conditions, claiming “prisoners are given food once a day. There are 16 men sitting in the cell, they have one bucket for all of them. It is forbidden to communicate with each other. They say: ‘Whoever talks will be taken out to the yard and shot.’”

Article 85 of the Fourth Geneva Convention requires that all protected persons must be held in environments not deleterious to their hygiene and health, a condition which the Commentary of 1958 argues is almost impossible to meet in overcrowded spaces. Importantly, while prisoners of war can be held in substandard facilities temporarily while more permanent quarters are established, civilian detainees must be provided with adequate space, bedding and sanitary facilities immediately on their detention. As with denial of medical care and insufficient food and water, poor conditions of detention can constitute torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment under some circumstances.

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101. Source KDD042; withheld due to protection concerns.
102. Source KDD015; withheld due to protection concerns.
104. Source KDD043; withheld due to protection concerns.
105. Source KDD044; withheld due to protection concerns.
107. Source KDD010; withheld due to protection concerns.
108. Source KDD036; withheld due to protection concerns.
110. Ibid, Article 85.
111. “Very severe prison conditions have been held to fall within the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on torture because the pain or suffering they inflict..."
3. SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE (SGBV)

Six of the cases observed in this report include accounts of the use of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). In the cases included in this report, SGBV was allegedly used intentionally to compel victims to cooperate or reveal information.

A community leader arrested for his anti-occupation positions had his pants pulled down and was actively threatened with being sodomized, a threat he believes he escaped only by agreeing to cooperate.112 A woman detained at a protest was threatened with rape during her detention, and in another case the threat was made against the relative of an individual in Russia's custody: "...soon after nightfall a group of blindfolded civilians, including [the detainee's] mother and sister, were led into the room. The soldiers told [the detainee] that unless he could procure women for them in future, his 23-year-old sister would be raped. She was led away out of sight to enforce the threat."113 It is not known whether the female relative was subjected to further SGBV. Three other individuals were repeatedly hit in the genitals during alleged torture.114 As with other forms of abuse, these numbers are likely undercounted, due to survivorship bias and reporting stigma.115 However, the accounts collected here align with other SGBV reporting and threats thereof in Russia-controlled Kherson oblast and throughout Russia-controlled areas in Ukraine.116

One doctor who treated victims of torture in a Kherson hospital claimed that he saw signs and heard stories of torture from patients: "Some of the worst were burn marks on genitals, a gunshot wound to the head of a girl who was raped and burns from an iron on a patient’s back and stomach. The patient told me two wires from a car battery were attached to his groin and he was told to stand on a wet rag."117 The United Nations has documented at least 100 cases of rape or sexual assault since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February, and in October 2022 the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Pramila Patten, asserted that rape has been used systematically by Russia’s forces as a weapon of war.118

Sexual violence is prohibited under numerous international humanitarian and human rights instruments, most explicitly article 1 of UNCAT.119 Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention may place them close to the borderline between cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and torture. They have sometimes been described as falling into a ‘grey area’ between torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment owing to lack of evidence of the intentional or purposive element required by the term ‘torture.’ “Fact Sheet No. 4 (Rev. 1), Combating Torture,” UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, accessed November 7, 2022, dchhr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/FactSheet4rev.1en.pdf, https://perma.cc/SL3T-BDET.

112. Source KDD045; withheld due to protection concerns.
113. Source KDD030; withheld due to protection concerns.
114. Source KDD046, KDD001; withheld due to protection concerns.
also stipulates that “Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.”

4. DETENTION OF FAMILY MEMBERS

Regardless of their treatment during and conditions of detention, the detention of an individual based solely on their relationship to another person is illegal under international law. Six cases of family members being detained or disappeared incidentally to the detention or disappearance of their relative were observed. In some cases, this appeared to result from their real or perceived involvement with the alleged activity for which Russia detained them. For example, several family members of a government official were detained for helping their relatives hide sensitive government data from Russia and its proxy authorities. In other cases, the primary reason for the detention of a family member appears to be in compelling their relative to give information or change behavior. The brother of one individual accused of planning an attack on infrastructure was allegedly detained to extract a confession from his brother. As described elsewhere, the sister and mother of a detainee were themselves detained, allegedly to pressure the detainee to find women for their captors to rape, on pain of the rape of the sister.

Articles 14, 15, 22 and 26 of the ICCPR forbids the prosecution of individuals for crimes they did not commit (i.e., for the alleged crimes of a relative) and guarantees freedom of association and equal protection under the law. Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention also provides that, even in wartime, “No protected person may be punished for an offense he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.”

5. THEFT ALLEGED FROM INDIVIDUALS DETAINED OR DISAPPEARED

Nineteen cases examined by Yale HRL describe the robbing of detainees' houses during arrest or while they were detained. This alleged theft was often additional to the confiscation of personal electronics described elsewhere in this report. One detainee claimed Russia's forces returned to his house while he was in custody and looted everything from gold to food under the pretext of conducting searches. One relative of a disappeared man claims the Russian soldiers who came to her house had brought empty bags for “plunder,” and that they took food and alcohol from the house. In another case, the Russian soldiers and FSB agents who arrested three members of a family allegedly took their cell phones, four laptops, and a jeep, among other things. Others

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121. Source KDD047; withheld due to protection concerns.
122. Source KDD036; withheld due to protection concerns.
123. Source KDD030; withheld due to protection concerns.
126. Source KDD048; withheld due to protection concerns.
127. Source KDD049; withheld due to protection concerns.
128. Source KDD050; withheld due to protection concerns.
also had their vehicles stolen by the forces arresting them. The head of a territorial community in Kherson oblast saw a list used by Russia’s forces in her community: “It included all the entrepreneurs of the community, that is, people who theoretically had money. The list was written in a woman’s handwriting. Russian soldiers followed [the list] from house to house and robbed people.”

Pillage is prohibited under the Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

6. FORCING DETAINED TO RECORD PROPAGANDA

Among the cases of arrest and disappearance examined for this study, 12 individuals in this dataset are known to have been forced to record videos for use in Russia-backed propaganda. The content of the videos featuring detainees varies; some were forced to confess to crimes, some were forced to apologize for anti-occupation content they had posted before, and some were forced to record videos saying they would cooperate with Russian occupation authorities moving forward. Several of the videos were made by one notorious Russia state media journalist, Ivan Litomin, who also published footage shot in at least one detained individual’s home. There are also several accounts of pro-occupation propaganda being posted on victims’ social media accounts.

Indications abound that the propaganda videos were made under duress. In some cases, individuals who appeared in videos while detained were released and later renounced what they had said while in captivity, claiming that they had only done so under severe duress. In some videos, family members claim to see evidence of beatings or torture on the faces or bodies of their detained relative. For example, one man said, “They abused me morally and psychologically, and threatened me with violence. Being under threat, knowing that my wife and daughter are in danger and under the control of the occupiers, I was forced to say [that crossing into Crimea under a Ukrainian passport was easy].” Another detainee was told explicitly that she would only be released if she sat for a recorded interview with a journalist. She was told that she should tell the truth, but,

...our leadership will decide. If they like what you say, then they will let you go. If you refuse to talk to journalists or say something that the leadership will not like, then you will be transferred from here to a place where there will be tuberculosis and rats. And maybe you will stay there not for a day or a week, but much longer.

In multiple cases, detainees were forced to “confess” to crimes. One man who briefly joined the Ukrainian Territorial Defense Force at the start of the war was arrested in the spring of 2022. Shortly thereafter, Russian media outlets began disseminating video of the man confessing to planning the kidnapping of an occupation official. One former law enforcement officer “confessed” to accepting money from a major English-language news organization to give

129. E.g., source KDD051; withheld due to protection concerns.
132. Source KDD026; withheld due to protection concerns.
133. Source KDD052, KDD053; withheld due to protection concerns.
134. Source KDD054, KDD025; withheld due to protection concerns.
135. Source KDD055; withheld due to protection concerns.
136. Source KDD017; withheld due to protection concerns.
137. Source KDD056; withheld due to protection concerns.
interviews and organize protests against Russia's control of Kherson.\textsuperscript{138} A veteran was forced to record videos in which he claimed to be a Right Sector militant and suggests Nazi affinity, providing “evidence” for the Russian claim of fighting Nazis in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{139} The man also claims in the video that there is no confidence in the Ukrainian government in Kyiv.\textsuperscript{140} In Russian media, these videos are shared without context and are purported to be real admissions of involvement in various acts of resistance or terrorism.\textsuperscript{141}

In other videos, detainees “apologize” for public statements made in the past that Russia’s forces considered insults. One man was told that he would only be released if he agreed to record an interview apologizing for calling Russia-aligned forces “orcs” and “occupiers.”\textsuperscript{142} Another woman recorded a video apologizing for previous anti-occupation videos she had posted online.\textsuperscript{143} Others were made to express their intention to cooperate with Russia and its proxy authorities thenceforth. One pledged to publish the “truth” and to cooperate with Russia and its proxy authorities, a promise he does not appear to have kept.\textsuperscript{144}

Finally, several videos examined here contain claims made under duress that conditions in Kherson are good and that residents are happy with Russia’s control of Kherson. One detainee was forced to record a video – which has since circulated on Russian social media – claiming that he had tried to recruit Kherson residents to help him blow up power infrastructure, but that his neighbors were so happy with Russia’s control that none would help him do so.\textsuperscript{145}

Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Conventions states that “Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.”\textsuperscript{146} This prohibition is extended (in the 2020 commentary on the Geneva Convention, among other places) to cover any likeness of a protected person that allows that person to be identified, as these videos clearly do.\textsuperscript{147}

### 7. ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES

Some of the cases profiled in this study may constitute enforced disappearances. This report relies upon existing open source material and analysts did not attempt to contact victims’ family members. Yale HRL therefore does not provide statistics on the proportion of cases that constitute enforced disappearances. Families of some of those detained have been unwilling to speak publicly

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{138} Source KDD0054; withheld due to protection concerns.
  \item \textsuperscript{139} The Right Sector (Ukrainian: Правий сектор) is a radical Ukrainian far-right movement and later political party formed during the Euromaidan protests that started in November 2013. See: Refworld. “Ukraine: Information on the Right Sector, Including Affiliated Groups and Activities. Involvement in Eastern Ukraine; Relations with Authorities (2013-July 2016).” Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, July 22, 2016. \url{https://archive.ph/ntJ2Z}, \url{https://www.refworld.org/docid/57b6d7424.html}.
  \item \textsuperscript{140} Source KDD0057; withheld due to protection concerns.
  \item \textsuperscript{141} Source KDD0058; withheld due to protection concerns.
  \item \textsuperscript{142} Source KDD0059; withheld due to protection concerns.
  \item \textsuperscript{143} Source KDD0025; withheld due to protection concerns.
  \item \textsuperscript{144} Source KDD0059; withheld due to protection concerns.
  \item \textsuperscript{145} Source KDD0060; withheld due to protection concerns.
  \item \textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
about contact they have made with Russia's authorities for fear of endangering their family members and friends. Unless an individual's relative specifically describes not having received information from or about their family member, it is possible that they know their family member's whereabouts but haven't written publicly about it. In the absence of such information Yale HRL is not able to prove the negative of families not receiving information about their missing relatives.

Nonetheless, several of the accounts documented in this report appear to constitute enforced disappearances. Some individuals have been held temporarily incommunicado; many social media posts about recent detentions and disappearances conclude with "current whereabouts unknown."\(^{148}\) The friend of one individual posted, "he did not get in touch with his wife. The doors of the apartment have been broken open. Neighbors, of course, do not know or hear anything. PLEASE HELP. WHO KNOWS WHERE YOU CAN GO IN KHERSON. HELP!!!!" apparently unsure of where he might be and what to do.\(^{149}\)

Information about the detention of others is often only made available when their fellow detainees are released and contact the media, the government of Ukraine, or families of those still missing. For example, the whereabouts of a local government figure detained by Russia's military in late March were unknown until a fellow detainee at a facility in Crimea was released and alerted another local government official. The man was detained for approximately six months before his whereabouts became known.\(^{150}\) The family of a woman who disappeared in May didn't learn of her whereabouts until a human rights group facilitated her sending two letters to her family in August. The letter alleged she was in Crimea, but no additional information or communication has reached her family since August.\(^{151}\) Likewise, the wife of a man detained in March 2022 has been able to get almost no information about her husband's whereabouts; after several visits to the offices of Russia's and Russia-aligned authorities it was confirmed only that he was detained. She has since received one call from a Russian military police officer asking for supplies for her husband but has heard nothing else; the man's wife learned that he had likely been moved to Crimea only through a fellow detainee who was released. All efforts to learn more about his condition, location, and reason for detention have been unsuccessful as of October 2022.\(^{152}\)

Finally, the families of some of those detained since 24 February have never learned anything of their relatives' fate. Many of the disappeared remain missing. For example, the wife of a local political leader did not know whether her disappeared husband was still alive after he was beaten and taken away by Russia's forces in early August. She only came to believe that he was alive two months later when other residents of their village claimed to have seen him being brought back to collect equipment belonging to the village council.\(^{153}\) Some only learned the fate of their disappeared family member when their body was found or returned. The woman described above whose husband's body was found in a river after his capture wrote on her Facebook page that day, "they killed you, tied your legs, tied a weight and drowned you....they didn't let me say goodbye to you!!! I don't know where you are...how to bury you, I'm not in Kherson now... My soul is sobbing, I'm trying to calm myself down, but tears are pouring out..."\(^{154}\) Yale HRL is not yet able to establish with confidence how many of these 226 cases represent such enforced disappearances because

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148. E.g., sources KDD061, KDD062, KDD063; withheld due to protection concerns.
149. Source KDD064; withheld due to protection concerns.
150. Source KDD065; withheld due to protection concerns.
151. Source KDD066; withheld due to protection concerns.
152. At the time of publication, the last known claims about family not being able to reach him were made in October. Sources KDD067, KDD068; withheld due to protection concerns.
153. Source KDD069; withheld due to protection concerns.
154. Source KDD070; withheld due to protection concerns. Ellipses are from the original post.
information about the release or location of imprisonment of any given person has not yet been established from the material available.

Article 25 of the Fourth Geneva Convention mandates, “All persons in the territory of a Party to the conflict, or in a territory occupied by it, shall be enabled to give news of a strictly personal nature to members of their families, wherever they may be, and to receive news from them. This correspondence shall be forwarded speedily and without undue delay.”155 Russia is not a party to the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, though Ukraine is.156 Enforced disappearances are also considered a crime against humanity under Article 3 of the Rome Statute, to which neither Russia nor Ukraine is a state party (however, Ukraine has accepted the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction since 2014).157 Additionally, the UN Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights have both found that enforced disappearance can constitute inhuman treatment of the next-of-kin of the disappeared.158 Finally, enforced disappearances can violate the extensive registration and notification requirements of the Geneva Conventions, including Article 136 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.159

8. DETENTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF REFERENDA

Two people in this dataset were allegedly detained for refusing to vote in the annexation referendum staged by Russia in late September 2022. They were detained by “armed soldiers of the Russian Federation, in the presence of women who carried ballot boxes and lists,” for “refusing to vote.”160 These accounts align with reporting of the highly militarized and coerced nature of the vote in Kherson and the other Russia-controlled oblasts.161 Residents and officials say that Russia and its proxy authorities were forced to “hunt” for votes because so few people would go to polling locations themselves.162 Russia’s state-controlled media claims that “voting will be organized in communities and in a door-to-door manner for security reasons.”163 Forced voting may violate Article 19 of the UDHR and Article 19 of the ICCPR.

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160. Source KDD071; withheld due to protection concerns.


9. TARGETING OF CRIMEAN TATARS

Crimean Tatars are a predominantly Sunni Muslim community indigenous to Crimea. The community has a long history of discrimination and deportation under Soviet control and Russia's occupation. In 1944 the community was deported en masse to Uzbekistan and other areas in Central Asia and Siberia by Soviet authorities. Soviet authorities did not allow them to return to Crimea until 1989, by which time their land had been resettled and traces of their historical relationship to the region systematically erased.164

Crimean Tatars have been targeted for arrest in Crimea since Russia occupied the peninsula in 2014. The Crimean Tatar Resource Center has documented scores of alleged detentions, disappearances, and killings of Crimean Tatars, largely at the hands of the FSB, since Russia seized control of Crimea in 2014.165 Some have allegedly been subject to torture before being charged with terrorism and/or affiliation with Crimean Tatar rights groups.166 Crimean Tatars in Crimea have also allegedly been “deliberately and disproportionately targeted in the implementation of Russia’s mobilization order and reportedly forcibly involved in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,” according to the Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine.167

The last complete Ukrainian census occurred in 2001, and little information about the size of the Crimean Tatar population in Kherson oblast has been published since then.168 Estimates for the Crimean Tatar population of Kherson oblast range from approximately 10,000 to as many as 55,000 (higher estimates include an unknown number of Crimean Tatars who fled Crimea after Russia illegally annexed the peninsula in 2014).169 This would suggest a Crimean Tatar population


before February 2022 between 0.98% and 5.41% of the total oblast population. Higher estimates likely substantially overcounted the population during Russia's illegal annexation, because as much as 70% of the Crimean Tatar population allegedly fled the oblast by May 2022.

Yale HRL has gathered reports of numerous raids on Crimean Tatar communities in Kherson, during which multiple people were detained or disappeared. Yale HRL collected 32 accounts of the detention or disappearance of Crimean Tatars since 24 February 2022, representing 14.5% of all detentions and disappearances examined. Many of these disappearances and detentions were grouped in areas of Kherson oblast near the Crimea border in communities with large Crimean Tatar populations. While Yale HRL did not intentionally select for cases concerning Crimean Tatars, neither was it possible to collect a random sample of detentions and disappearances.

Crimean Tatars in this database were over four times more likely to be captured by members of the FSB as compared to non-Crimean Tatar persons. Fewer Crimean Tatars are known to have been released after being detained, with 37.5% of Crimean Tatars in this dataset known released compared to 53.4% of non-Crimean Tatars. Crimean Tatars in this dataset were significantly more likely to face legal charges than were non-Crimean Tatars. Crimean Tatars were charged with a crime approximately five times more often than non-Crimean Tatars in this dataset. Crimean Tatars represent 60% of those legally charged despite comprising 14.5% of all individuals.

Twelve (37.5%) of Crimean Tatar detentions and disappearances involve allegations of membership in the Noman Çelebicivan Battalion. The Noman Çelebicivan Battalion is an organization composed of Crimean Tatars in Kherson oblast who were involved in the brief efforts to blockade Crimea in 2015 following Russia's illegal annexation the year before. The organization was never recognized by the Ukrainian government. The Supreme Court of Russia declared the group a terrorist organization on 1 June 2022 and Crimean Tatars charged since then have been accused of membership in 2015 and 2016. Yale HRL has been unable to identify a single other country that has listed the organization as a terrorist group.


171. According to the numbers given by Tamila Tasheva, the permanent representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the Crimean Tatar population of Kherson as of May 2022 was a mere 3,000 people, meaning that this sample represents one of every 100 persons. “70% кримських татар, що жили на Херсонщині, покинули свої домівки,” Novynarnia, May 19, 2022, https://novynarnia.com/2022/05/19/70-krymskyh-tatar/

172. E.g. Анастасія Ісаєнкова, ‘Ми не можемо не шукати паралелей з 1944 роком’ — інтерв’ю з Тамілою Ташевою,” Суспільне Новини, May 18, 2022, https://perma.cc/W2NE-TD7E.


175. According to the numbers given by Tamila Tasheva, the permanent representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the Crimean Tatar population of Kherson as of May 2022 was a mere 3,000 people, meaning that this sample represents one of every 100 persons. “70% кримських татар, що жили на Херсонщині, покинули свої домівки,” Novynarnia, May 19, 2022, https://novynarnia.com/2022/05/19/70-krymskyh-tatar/

176. The group did not appear on any international lists and is also absent from the lists of other members of the Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States. See: Антитеррористический центр государств — участников Содружества Независимых Государств, "Список Террористических и Экстремистских Организаций." Accessed November 11, 2022, https://archive.ph/MnsRr.
As with all statistics provided in this report, the numbers presented here are based on a collection methodology that is non-random and not a representative population sample and cannot be assumed to represent the population of Kherson oblast. While heavily suppressed in Crimea, the Crimean Tatar community in unoccupied areas of Ukraine has active and sophisticated human rights, media, and organizational infrastructure, which may have led to these cases being primed for inclusion given this report’s methodologies and scope.

D. ALLEGED DETENTION SITES

Yale HRL was able to identify with high confidence 12 locations in the Russia-controlled areas of Kherson oblast and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to which people arrested or detained in Kherson oblast were brought. These locations serve or served as interrogation and detention facilities for people detained by Russia and Russia-aligned forces in Kherson oblast. They vary in original purpose: some were part of Ukraine’s peace-time criminal justice system (police stations and pre-trial detention facilities), while others were adapted from civilian infrastructure (such as schools) to serve as detention facilities. Several locations have served multiple additional purposes for Russia, such as military headquarters, administrative seats, or stations used by new Russia-backed police forces. Finally, certain locations identified by Yale HRL also served as checkpoints for vehicles moving within Kherson oblast or across the Kherson-Crimea border. Three of these are counted among the 12 high-confidence detention locations as examples of a larger system of checkpoints. The true number of checkpoints in the oblast is certainly much higher, but few are described in detail in open sources; people allegedly passing through dozens of checkpoints on a journey are unlikely to describe each one.178

Yale HRL imagery analysts observed queues of vehicles stationed behind permanent border crossings and/or temporarily installed road obstacles as they awaited passage through several identified checkpoints, in commercially available, Very High Resolution (VHR) satellite imagery. These observed queues constituted a notable divergence from observations in pre-invasion imagery. Imagery analysts observed changes in the number and arrangement of vehicles present at and near several other identified detention and interrogation locations, indicating continued use of the facility, possibly for activity related to detentions, interrogation, and enforced disappearances (See Appendix I for a full and detailed list of those observable indicators potentially consistent with activity related to extrajudicial detention and enforced disappearances in Kherson oblast). Examples of several identified detention sites and checkpoints are displayed in detail in Appendix II.

Table 2: Types of facilities involved in detention and disappearances in Kherson oblast.

| CAPTURE | Three of the facilities included in this report served as vectors for capture. All are roadblocks, either on the border between Kherson and Crimea or within Kherson oblast. Accounts from individuals who passed through these locations allege people are captured based either on their presence on a list or because the forces operating the locations find something they consider suspicious during questioning. At two of three capture locations, interrogations are also alleged to have occurred, though they never appear to last more than a day (thereafter people are released or transferred to a detention facility). |
| INTERROGATION | Interrogation is known to occur in all but one of the locations examined by Yale HRL (the last being a checkpoint). At some, the only documented interrogations were brief and preliminary (there are no accounts of people being kept at checkpoints for longer than a day). At others, interrogations lasted for extended periods and were thus paired with detention; several people alleged being actively interrogated for several weeks. Methods, conditions, and forces involved vary widely, as described in sections II B and C. |
| EXTRALEGAL DETENTION | Several of the detention locations identified in this report have been used to hold people not accused of crimes or otherwise formally introduced into the Russia-imposed legal system. These vary from ad-hoc (the basement of a school) to purpose-built (a pre-trial detention facility). |
| JUDICIAL DETENTION | A limited number of locations identified in this report appear to be integrated in the formal Russia-imposed legal system and used to house individuals awaiting or at trial or sentencing. Accounts collected here raise substantial concerns about the due process protections enjoyed by people in these facilities, and the word “judicial” should not be taken to imply that any due process standards are met. |

179. Представництво Президента України в Автономній Республіці Крим, "Ситуація по незаконному затриманню громадян України в тимчасово окупованих районах Херсонщини...," Facebook, March 11, 2022, [link]; Янковський, "«Залякують в’язницю в Сибіру»," Радіо Свобода, July 6, 2022, [link]; Aleksei Aleksandrov and Reid Standish, "Lists, Disappearances, And Talk Of A Referendum: Life In Russian-Occupied Southern Ukraine," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 23, 2022, sec. Ukraine, [link]; Other sources KDD003, KDD076; withheld due to protection concerns.
1. KHerson OBLAST

Yale HRL was able to establish with high confidence the locations and uses of seven detention facilities within Kherson oblast. Among these facilities, two of the locations in Kherson oblast are in the basements of schools occupied by Russia’s forces. Four are housed in adapted domestic security facilities such as police stations or detention facilities, and one is housed in an administrative building.

![Detention Facilities in Kherson Oblast & Crimea](image)

*Figure 6: Detention facilities in Kherson oblast & Crimea, aggregated by number of persons detained per facility per raion. People held at unknown locations are not pictured.*

In addition to these seven detention facilities in Kherson oblast, Yale HRL has identified six additional sites where there have been reports of detention and interrogation occurring that do not reach Yale HRL’s high confidence standard. There are an insufficient number or quality of accounts for these locations to establish high confidence.

These detention locations appear to serve divergent purposes and to be operated in different ways. In certain detention centers, interrogation appeared to follow a deliberate trajectory leading either to release or trial in Crimea. At other locations, treatment, length of stay, and release appeared completely contingent on the caprice of captors. For example, in one location a detainee was brutalized and fellow detainees were executed only until the unit occupying the facility was
rotated out, after which he was released and offered a signing bonus to join Russia's forces.\(^{180}\) In other cases the captors at one location were responsible for treating the injuries other detainees sustained during torture at another location.\(^{181}\)

Yale HRL has collected reports of the use of torture for all seven of the detention facilities in Kherson oblast identified with high confidence. There are reports of the use of mock executions at two facilities, and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) or the threat thereof was documented in at least three of the facilities. Finally, there are multiple reports of executions in at least one facility.

2. CRIMEA

This report focuses on detention and disappearances in Kherson oblast. However, Yale HRL has documented connections between disappearances and detentions in Kherson oblast and transport to Crimea and included such information in this report. Owing to the limited scope of this report, the two locations identified in Crimea are only those to which people detained in Kherson oblast are allegedly regularly transported. Many of the individuals held at these locations have been charged with a crime, are standing trial, are awaiting sentencing, or are awaiting transportation after sentencing. In some cases these people are allowed to meet with lawyers, and, in at least one case, to see their family.\(^{182}\) However, due process standards appear to be extremely low, and many people identified as being held at these locations were tortured before they arrived or while in judicial detention, raising serious questions about their ability to receive a fair trial. Accounts from both facilities in Crimea reference the use of torture and beatings.

3. CHECKPOINTS

Yale HRL was able to identify with high confidence three checkpoints at which people have been detained and/or interrogated. Two are checkpoints on or near the administrative border with Crimea where there are reports of detention and interrogation in addition to capture occurring. At both locations there are accounts of the threat of violence, though Yale HRL has found no reports of violence being executed at either. A third location is located within Kherson oblast. There are accounts of a family being shot while trying to pass through this checkpoint during the early days of Russia's control, but no other accounts of violence have been observed by Yale HRL.\(^{183}\)

The checkpoints described in this report represent a small fraction of those present in Kherson oblast. Yale HRL has documented the presence of several other checkpoints, both at administrative borders and within the oblast, but has included only three checkpoints in which we have high confidence based on our methodology. Narratives of people's journeys across the oblast or of efforts to leave it sometimes feature dozens of checkpoints encountered on a drive of a few hundred kilometers.\(^{184}\) Movement through some checkpoints is exceptionally slow; one man claimed that he and his family waited three days in their car before turning back at just one of the

\(^{180}\) Source KDD030; withheld due to protection concerns.  
\(^{181}\) Source KDD077; withheld due to protection concerns.  
\(^{182}\) Source KDD079; withheld due to protection concerns.  
\(^{183}\) Source KDD080; withheld due to protection concerns.  
“two dozen” checkpoints encountered driving from the city of Kherson to Melitopol.\textsuperscript{185}

Individuals were allegedly detained at checkpoints for a variety of reasons. At several checkpoints, Russia’s forces demanded that men strip their clothes and arrested those with tattoos or bruises they considered suspicious: “Men go out [from the car] at every checkpoint. First of all, their t-shirts are removed. If there are no tattoos, please, go back [to the car]. A tattooed boy was traveling with us and we spent a lot of time on him. His things were checked, he was undressed, his pants were taken off. At one checkpoint, even his underwear.”\textsuperscript{186} At one checkpoint on the border with Crimea, bags are allegedly passed through scanners and men are brought to mobile containers installed for interrogation.\textsuperscript{187} Russia’s forces also frequently searched the phones of those passing through checkpoints for contacts with targeted Ukrainians (veterans, soldiers, SBU agents, and police).\textsuperscript{188} At one checkpoint, a man was allegedly detained because Russia’s forces disapproved of how his wife’s contact was saved in his phone.\textsuperscript{189} There are also claims that Russia’s forces maintain lists of people forbidden from leaving the oblast, either for Ukraine-held territory or Crimea.\textsuperscript{190}

E. DISTINCTIONS FROM FILTRATION OPERATIONS IN DONETSK OBLAST

The disappearances and detention in Kherson oblast are distinct from the system of filtration observed by Yale HRL in Donetsk oblast. In August 2022 Yale HRL produced a report entitled “System of Filtration: Mapping Russia’s Detention Operations in Donetsk Oblast,” in which it identified with high confidence 21 sites that constituted a filtration system for processing the civilian population of Donetsk oblast.\textsuperscript{191} In Donetsk oblast the system appeared intended to process the entire population of the oblast; documents circulated by the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) instructed all residents to undergo filtration at designated locations, and many groups of people were taken involuntarily to filtration locations when their location was overtaken by Russia-aligned forces. The system in Donetsk oblast was managed in large part by authorities of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, with additional involvement of Russia’s soldiers and FSB (Federal Security Service) agents.

The findings in this report demonstrate a substantially different system in Kherson oblast. Russia’s and Russia-aligned forces in Kherson appear to target specific individuals based on their perceived identity, social role, or activity, rather than attempting to filter the entire population in search of people who could be perceived as threats to Russia’s control.

In Kherson oblast, local Russia-aligned or -appointed forces appear to have been less involved in controlling the population than their counterparts in Donetsk oblast, which may reflect the


\textsuperscript{187} Source KDD022; withheld due to protection concerns.

\textsuperscript{188} Sources KDD022, KDD076, KDD081; withheld due to protection concerns.

\textsuperscript{189} Source KDD076; withheld due to protection concerns.

\textsuperscript{190} Source KDD082; withheld due to protection concerns.

shorter term of Russia’s control of Kherson. Unlike in Donetsk oblast where the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) had exercised authority over parts of the oblast since 2014, Russia’s authorities in Kherson oblast found themselves in charge of a population newly controlled by Russia or Russia-aligned forces in early 2022. Authorities of the so-called DPR had established political and administrative infrastructure over eight years in parts of Donetsk oblast with which they could mold the population in the parts of the oblast they controlled and weed out any people who could oppose them. Thus, they were more easily able to expand this established infrastructure to newly controlled areas of the oblast after February 2022. Moreover, forces in Donetsk oblast were able to take advantage of the siege of Mariupol and other fierce fighting in the southern part of the oblast to force vulnerable civilians to undergo filtration as they were fleeing imminent danger. The approach observed in Kherson oblast, however, may reflect a need to control the population differently. Russia-aligned authorities in Kherson oblast lacked occupation-specific infrastructure on which to build. Moreover, there was less civilian flight from combat zones in Kherson oblast compared to Donetsk oblast.

III. CONCLUSION

Ukraine’s forces liberated areas of Kherson oblast in the days before publication of this report west of the Dnipro River, an area that includes Kherson city and several detention locations described in this report. The implications of this development for individuals detained at those locations is not yet clear; no consistent allegations of the release, transportation, or deaths of those individuals have yet been made. Additional information and possible verification of allegations made in this report are likely to emerge as more locations are accessed by Ukraine’s government.

This report makes clear that Russia’s forces must be held accountable for the crimes they allegedly committed in Kherson oblast. While some individuals described here are known to have been released, many others remain in detention or are missing, their fates unknown to their families. Some of those held incommunicado may have died or been killed, as were the four people in this report known to have died in custody. Beyond accountability, a humanitarian response is also needed to identify missing persons, notify families about the status of loved ones, identify any human remains, and to provide psychosocial support to the individuals and families impacted by torture, detention, and enforced disappearance in Kherson oblast.


APPENDIX I: METHODOLOGY

The investigative methodology for this report combines open source investigation with Very High Resolution (VHR) satellite imagery analysis. The VHR imagery used to support this investigation was commercially available, unclassified imagery captured by Maxar Technologies, Planet Labs PBC, and BlackSky Global, LLC. Given the limitations of satellite imagery to gather information on events occurring within buildings, this report primarily rests on extensive open source research, with an emphasis on aggregating, verifying, and collating multiple sources to understand the cases of extrajudicial detentions and enforced disappearances in Kherson oblast examined in this report.

OPEN SOURCE DATA ANALYSIS

INDIVIDUAL PROFILES

Given the targeted nature of extrajudicial detentions and enforced disappearances in Kherson, individual profiles were gathered on missing persons to establish possible patterns and trends about these incidents. The general methodological approach of this research is outlined below:

1. INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFICATION: Individual accounts alleging detentions or disappearances were first identified through open source research. Most were first identified through primary sources including missing-persons social media accounts, town or village social media groups, the individual social media posts of concerned persons (often family), and the social media of returned individuals themselves. Additional individuals were identified while researching those encountered as above; other individuals mentioned in social media posts or news articles were then researched as well. Once an allegation of missingness had been found, additional information was gathered from other social media, traditional media, and Ukrainian and international human rights organizations. Finally, any reference made to individuals in either Ukrainian or Russian government sources was explored. Ukrainian, Russian, and English language sources were all considered, and at this stage the validity or bias of specific sources was not assessed.

2. OPEN SOURCE INVESTIGATIVE ANALYSIS: Based on the above identification, a profile was created for each individual including as much information as was publicly available about their demographic identity, social role, activity during the war, allegations of detention or disappearance, alleged conditions in detention, release, recapture, interactions with the formal legal system, and changes in behavior. Any additional pertinent information was recorded. Where any of the above data was not available in the sources initially gathered, further research was done into the sources described above. Where names were withheld or changed in a source, information was only added to a profile if Yale HRL could establish through other information that the individual in question was a match.

The average number of sources per case was 5.3, for a total of more than 1,100 sources for individual narratives alone (the true number far exceeds even this, as not all sources were recorded if they provided identical information of the same provenance). Two cases relied on a single source but were included because that source was a major human rights organization. In both cases the organizations had withheld information that might have enabled identification of the individual (and thus more sources), though they have verified information in these accounts themselves. The maximum number of sources for a single case was 11. Figure 7 shows the distribution of source counts for the dataset.
Figure 7: The number of sources used to document individual accounts of detention and disappearances.

3. **VERIFICATION**: Given the accounts’ individualized nature, a high confidence rating cannot be issued for individual stories. However, multiple sources corroborating a similar pattern establishes credible allegations. Verification was conducted according to protocols developed by Amnesty International\(^{194}\) and the Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations.\(^{195}\) These protocols included:

   a. **Geolocation**: If the information was available and sufficiently credible, analysts tried to connect individuals to a specific place of disappearance and detention.

   b. **Credibility and sufficiency**: The identity of the poster or publisher was checked to identify potential bias. Verification by large, independent organizations with strong reputations for careful work and ground access, such as the New York Times and Human Rights Watch provided additional corroborating information. Primary sources were also checked for expertise, clear proximity to events, political, economic or other ulterior motivations, and reputation for posting authenticated content. The presence of multiple types of sources attesting to the same fact or image lent credibility to assertions made therein.

   c. **Confirmation**: Any ambiguities or divergent conclusions were reconciled and, where they could not be, those conclusions or the individual’s case were excluded from this report. The team reviewed all open source accounts, location verification, and any claims regarding a site.

Any sources for which serious inconsistencies or misrepresentations were apparent were excluded, as were accounts for which there is insufficient information to establish that a person was detained or disappeared (as opposed to, for example, killed in shelling).

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LOCATION PROFILES
For a site to be included in the final count of this report, it had to be described by at least five independently corroborated open source reports. Satellite imagery verification was not required but was used as additional verification when it was relevant and available. The general methodological approach of this research included multiple levels of engagement by both the open source investigative team and the geospatial analysis team. To confirm findings with high confidence, each step included two- to three-person concurrence. Where analysts disagreed, no high-confidence rating was issued. The steps are outlined below:

1. LOCATION IDENTIFICATION: Potential detention sites were identified through primary source reports and allegations. This included extensive searches on social media to gather information and accounts on possible temporary roadblocks and checkpoints as well as permanent detention locations. Additional sites were identified by their use as detention facilities before the invasion, especially in location directories. Where images and descriptions of sites did not include coordinates or addresses, geolocation techniques (described below) were used to establish the location and name of sites. Accounts related to individuals in the dataset in some cases also referenced detention locations. Finally, the reporting of other highly reputable organizations such as independent media and human rights organizations was referenced.

2. OPEN SOURCE INVESTIGATIVE ANALYSIS: Each site identified was then investigated to find further allegations of extrajudicial detentions and enforced disappearances in secondary sources. These particularly included media reports from English, Ukrainian, and Russian sources that included interviews with survivors. Sources were then reviewed for any details regarding the activity occurring at a given site. The details were combined to establish a profile of each site that included a) who passed through it (gender, age, role), b) what the site was used for (checkpoint, interrogation, detention), c) whether a site was in Kherson or Crimea d) what conditions were like (sufficiency of food, overcrowding, etc.), and e) whether abuses reportedly occurred.

3. VERIFICATION: The team conducted a review of all open source accounts, location verification, and any claims made about activities at the site. Sites with at least five high-credibility corroborating reports were considered verified and included in the final count. Just as the individual profiles above, location verification was conducted according to protocols developed by Amnesty International196 and the Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations.197 These protocols included:

   a. Geolocation: Facilities were geolocated by matching ground photographs and videos of facilities used for extrajudicial detention and enforced disappearances with pre-invasion imagery from the buildings in question. Reference images were gathered from online map services (Google Street View, Yandex Street Panoramas, OpenStreetMap, etc.), user-uploaded public image sites (Google Maps, Yandex, Flickr, etc.), social media (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Telegram) and websites and directories for public institutions (school websites, government directories, etc.). Once located, photographs and videos were checked for authenticity by examining their metadata and identifying elements that confirmed that the image or video was captured when claimed. Once the authenticity of images and videos was established, unique identifiers pictured in the photographs or videos were matched to identical identifiers in the reference material.

b. Credibility and sufficiency: The identity of the poster or publisher was checked to identify potential bias. Verification by large, independent organizations with strong reputations for careful work and ground access, such as the New York Times and Human Rights Watch provided additional corroborating information. Primary sources were also checked for expertise, clear proximity to events, political, economic or other ulterior motivations, and reputation for posting authenticated content. The presence of multiple types of sources attesting to the same fact or image lent credibility to assertions made therein.

c. Confirmation: Each collection of sources was finally reviewed by a second analyst to confirm the reliability of sources, findings, and conclusions. Any ambiguities or divergent conclusions were reconciled and, where they could not be reconciled, sites were excluded from this report.

4. GEOSPATIAL ANALYSIS: Finally, Yale HRL analysts examined remote VHR imagery for objects and patterns consistent with the presence of activity related to extrajudicial detention and enforced disappearances at sites (see “Observable indicators in imagery relevant to extrajudicial detention and enforced disappearance operations” below). This information proved particularly useful in outdoor facilities and road checkpoints, where changes were visible to satellites. Remote imagery was also used to confirm the spatio-temporal conclusions reached in the verification stage.

LIMITATIONS: OPEN SOURCE DATA ANALYSIS

The sites identified in this report represent those for which Yale HRL has high confidence. Additional sites were identified, but information available at the time of writing was insufficient to establish high confidence.

Information included in this data set is based on allegations made in open source material by the subjects of and witnesses to detentions and disappearances. This information was added to the dataset unless an assertion contradicted another or could be shown to be demonstrably impossible based on other open source or satellite analysis. For example, it is possible that subjects and witnesses who observed uniformed organizations conflated members of Russia’s military with its National Guard. Likewise, the specific non-uniformed forces may be undercounted because subjects and witnesses were unable to identify them.

Yale HRL was able to neither verify any specific claims made by former detainees, the families of detainees, or their supporters, nor to collect a sample of detentions that Yale HRL considers sufficiently random to draw conclusions about the character of extrajudicial detention in general. Open source material is limited by a survivorship bias, with people who never leave a facility unable to communicate their experience in it. These may include people who are held indefinitely or who are killed in detention. The same applies to any people who are unable to communicate their experience after release; internet in occupied areas of Ukraine is now diverted through Russia where it can be censored. Other information is inaccessible, often because it has been removed from social media sites. Finally, certain forms of violence or inhumane treatment are less likely to be reported, resulting in a reporting bias. This is particularly true of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), which victims may not report due to shame or fear of social censorship.


SATELLITE IMAGERY ANALYSIS

OBSERVABLE INDICATORS IN IMAGERY RELEVANT TO DETENTION AND ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE OPERATIONS

In previous reporting on the operation of the filtration system in Donetsk oblast, Yale HRL imagery analysts structured their assessment on a list of observable objects and changes in patterns of activity potentially consistent with filtration sites or filtration-related activities. These observable indicators, referred to as “observables”, were based in part on the Mass Atrocity Remote Sensing (MARS)-Relevant Observables and Corresponding Typing Methods published in 2013 by Harvard Humanitarian Initiative’s (HHI) Signal Program for Human Security and Technology. The MARS framework is intended to address a lack of widely accepted forensic standards for corroborating alleged mass atrocities with remote sensing. This framework was again employed in this report to define what observable indicators Yale HRL denoted as possibly relevant to extrajudicial detention and/or enforced disappearances and/or other related operations (Table i). From imagery, many but not all the observable indicators identified by Yale HRL as potentially consistent with filtration-related operations in Donetsk oblast are similarly identified here as potentially consistent with extrajudicial detention and enforced disappearances in Kherson oblast, in accordance with the differences elucidated in this report in how systems for monitoring civilians operated in the two oblasts.

Table i. Observable indicators potentially consistent with activity related to extrajudicial detention and enforced disappearances in Kherson oblast

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observable indicators</th>
<th>Relevance to detention and disappearance operations</th>
<th>Activity that may correlate with indicator</th>
<th>Critical characteristics</th>
<th>Caveats and limitations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Presence of tents, containers, or tent- or container-like structures | Open-source reporting cited an individual who says they were interrogated in a mobile container being used at the facility at which they were held. In Donetsk oblast, tents were present at some identified filtration sites. | Holding or extrajudicial detention of individuals | • Appearance of tents or containers, particularly after 24 Feb 2022  
• Presence or absence of external markings to narrow identification | Some tents or containers that may have been used at purported extrajudicial detention sites may have no distinctive markings. Containers used for activity related to extrajudicial detention or enforced disappearances may have already been present at a facility before the invasion and merely repurposed. Non-imagery corroboration is important for confirming that these tents or containers are sites being used for detention- or disappearance-related activities, especially given that activity at these sites occurred within these structures and is unlikely observable in satellite imagery. |


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Caveats and limitations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presence of queues of persons</td>
<td>Open-source reporting on filtration in Donetsk oblast included interviews of Ukrainians who underwent filtration in which interviewees cited having to stand in long queues for long periods of time. This could potentially be relevant to extrajudicial detention in Kherson oblast.</td>
<td>Processing and/or screening of extrajudicially detained persons</td>
<td>• Appearance of queues not visible or of a higher density than in previous and baseline imagery</td>
<td>The identity of persons in queue cannot be easily ascertained even with very high resolution imagery without non-imagery analysis. At locations such as schools, for example, there is a possibility that lines may be crowds of students or parents collecting their children. Information about the operational status of the school would be needed to increase confidence that observed queues are indicative of activities consistent with detentions and enforced disappearances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of long lines of cars and/or buses</td>
<td>Open-source reporting has cited several checkpoints, temporary and/or permanent, within Kherson oblast and along the border between Kherson oblast and Crimea.</td>
<td>Processing and/or screening of people Transportation of people to other detention sites</td>
<td>• Long lines of cars/buses and other ground vehicles on roadways do not present in previous imagery. • Nature of buildings or other locations on the road (supermarkets, petrol stations)</td>
<td>There may also be queues of cars, buses, and other ground vehicles by petrol stations, supermarkets, or checkpoints, among other locations. Non-imagery corroboration of an extrajudicial detention site is necessary for imagery to conclude that the presence of long lines of vehicles is consistent with a queue for detention-related operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of military and/or civilian ground vehicles at a purported extrajudicial detention site</td>
<td>The presence of military vehicles may be suggestive of ongoing activity at a facility, including activity potentially related to extrajudicial detention and enforced disappearances.</td>
<td>Processing and/or screening Transportation of people to other detention sites</td>
<td>• Type of military vehicle, if identifiable by top-down imagery • Multiple identical vehicles in surrounding area</td>
<td>The presence of military and/or civilian ground vehicles alone does not necessarily indicate activity related to extrajudicial detention and enforced disappearances and may indicate other possible phenomena, for example as a base for military or security operations or regular vehicle presence consistent with baseline imagery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudden increase in the number or density of ground vehicles located in the lot of or near a purported extrajudicial detention site</td>
<td>Changes in the quantity of vehicles present at an identified detention facility may indicate that activity of some kind is occurring at a facility, including activity potentially related to extrajudicial detention or enforced disappearances.</td>
<td>Processing and/or screening of Ukrainian civilians</td>
<td>• Imagery showing a notable increase in ground vehicles parked in the lot of a purported site • Imagery showing a notable increase in ground vehicles stationed on or along the streets adjoining a purported site, ideally against a pre-invasion or pre-event baseline</td>
<td>It is unlikely that imagery can confidently conclude that an increase in vehicles at or near a site is indicative of extrajudicial detention and enforced disappearance operations. Seasonal or event-based variation in traffic density, changes in the overall security situation, and changes in economic standing could all offer alternative explanations for sudden changes in traffic density or pattern. Non-imagery corroboration is necessary to support any conclusion by imagery that an increase in vehicles may be consistent with activity related to extrajudicial detention and enforced disappearances.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Critical characteristics**

- • Appearance of queues not visible or of a higher density than in previous and baseline imagery
- • Long lines of cars/buses and other ground vehicles on roadways do not present in previous imagery.
- • Nature of buildings or other locations on the road (supermarkets, petrol stations)
- • Type of military vehicle, if identifiable by top-down imagery
- • Multiple identical vehicles in surrounding area
- • Imagery showing a notable increase in ground vehicles parked in the lot of a purported site
- • Imagery showing a notable increase in ground vehicles stationed on or along the streets adjoining a purported site, ideally against a pre-invasion or pre-event baseline
- • Presence of military and/or civilian ground vehicles at a purported extrajudicial detention site
- • Changes in the quantity of vehicles present at an identified detention facility

**Caveats and limitations**

- The identity of persons in queue cannot be easily ascertained even with very high resolution imagery without non-imagery analysis. At locations such as schools, for example, there is a possibility that lines may be crowds of students or parents collecting their children. Information about the operational status of the school would be needed to increase confidence that observed queues are indicative of activities consistent with detentions and enforced disappearances.
- There may also be queues of cars, buses, and other ground vehicles by petrol stations, supermarkets, or checkpoints, among other locations. Non-imagery corroboration of an extrajudicial detention site is necessary for imagery to conclude that the presence of long lines of vehicles is consistent with a queue for detention-related operations.
- The presence of military and/or civilian ground vehicles alone does not necessarily indicate activity related to extrajudicial detention and enforced disappearances and may indicate other possible phenomena, for example as a base for military or security operations or regular vehicle presence consistent with baseline imagery.
- It is unlikely that imagery can confidently conclude that an increase in vehicles at or near a site is indicative of extrajudicial detention and enforced disappearance operations. Seasonal or event-based variation in traffic density, changes in the overall security situation, and changes in economic standing could all offer alternative explanations for sudden changes in traffic density or pattern. Non-imagery corroboration is necessary to support any conclusion by imagery that an increase in vehicles may be consistent with activity related to extrajudicial detention and enforced disappearances.
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</table>
| Frequent changes in the arrangement or position of vehicles at or near a purported site indicates that traffic is coming to and departing from lots or other areas near the site. This may be a possible indicator of the facility being used for extrajudicial detention or interrogation operations, though this observation alone does not lead to a definitive conclusion of such activity occurring. | Processing and/or screening of people | • Changes in cardinal direction in which vehicles are parked/located  
• Changes in sections of lot/area in which vehicles are parked/located | It is unlikely that imagery alone can confidently conclude that a change in the arrangement or position of vehicles at or near a site is indicative of detention and/or enforced disappearances.  
Seasonal or event-based variation in traffic and changes in the overall security situation are among possible alternative explanations for sudden changes in traffic in- and out-flow. Non-imagery corroboration is necessary to support any conclusion by imagery that changes in the position of vehicles is an indicator of extrajudicial detention and enforced disappearances. |

**LIMITATIONS: SATELLITE IMAGERY ANALYSIS**

There are several limitations to satellite imagery use when identifying and/or corroborating extrajudicial detention sites. Satellite imagery is unable to identify or verify activities occurring inside buildings. Imagery verification of alleged sites is limited to the analysis of observable indicators visible on the external structure and/or the surrounding area (discussed below).

Many singular observables are ambiguous and cannot be deemed indicators of activities related to detention or enforced disappearances through imagery alone. For example, an observed change in the number of vehicles located near or outside a purported site could possibly be an indicator of people being brought by captors to a detention or interrogation site, but it could also be an indicator of non-nefarious and even normal operating activity that happens to be taking place in the observed facility, or a particular moment of the day at which there is higher-than-average traffic flow. While pre-war imagery can be used to determine baseline traffic or average parking density in order to conclude whether or not a change in the array or volume of vehicles appears to diverge from some sort of baseline level, it is nonetheless difficult to definitively attribute that change to detention-related activity and conclusively eliminate possible alternative explanations for the observed change without non-imagery reporting and analysis that supports the existence of an extrajudicial detention site or activities related to extrajudicial detention or enforced disappearances. On imagery alone, most sites will lack unambiguous observables. As a result, OSINT reporting and corroboration is heavily relied upon to support findings and verification of reports.

The ability of imagery to detect or verify sites is limited by the volume, frequency and quality of imagery captured at a given location. Probabilistically, if a satellite passes over a given village with low frequency, the likelihood of capturing mobile observable indicators like queues of people or queues of vehicles and the ability to establish a sufficiently narrow time window for attributing an observable to an extrajudicial detention site or process with any level of confidence are low. Therefore, the percentage of purported sites for which there is corroborating satellite imagery is relatively small. Thus, while imagery may enhance the confidence of Yale HRL in confirming the existence of an extrajudicial detention site, lack of available imagery or lack of imagery capable of definitively corroborating non-imagery findings does not reduce the degree of confidence in the existence of an extrajudicial detention site.
Finally, measurements of features such as ground markings and vehicles can be distorted because of the off-nadir angle of the imagery, resulting in measurements that may diverge from actual ground dimensions. For example, at a site for which imagery was captured from an angle south of the site, measurements of length may be at risk of distortion while measurements of width are unaffected by the off-nadir angle. In addition, measurements may have a margin of error, particularly in measuring disturbances of earth or other ground markings less than 5 meters in length or width due to: (1) the resolution of imagery available; (2) the measuring tool in the platform utilized by HRL being restricted to 1 meter increments; and (3) blurred or fuzzy boundaries of disturbed earth shapes, unlike the sharper edges observed on vehicles or building roofs. To mitigate this potential measurement error, three imagery analysts independently measure each marking of interest. The three length and width measurements for each marking are then averaged together to assess the magnitude of differences in measurement between analysts. After concluding there are no outliers in measurement across analysts, an average length and width across all objects is calculated to determine the average object size on a given date's imagery.
APPENDIX II | SATELLITE IMAGERY

Observable indicators at sites confirmed with high confidence

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Yale SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH

Humanitarian Research Lab
Physical appearance of the facility (outlined below) in July 2021, prior to the 24 February 2022 full-scale invasion.
Vehicles consistent with KAMAZ- and/or URAL-type are visible along the north-facing side of one of the facility’s buildings. A KAMAZ-type vehicle appears along the west-facing side of another facility building. There are several vehicles along the west-facing side of the facility’s westernmost buildings. Road obstacles appear along the road west of the facility. These military vehicles are not visible in the next available imagery from October 2022.
CHECKPOINT 01

Physical facility appearance on 21 February 2022, approximately one week prior to the 24 February 2022 full-scale invasion. This general location had been identified as a military base prior to 24 February 2022.

CHECKPOINT FACILITY

TRENCHES CONSISTENT WITH MILITARY ACTIVITY
A significant increase in queueing and activity appears in post-invasion imagery. Vehicle queue approx. 700 meters long awaits passage southward through road obstacles and a permanent border checkpoint. Another vehicle queue approx. 1 kilometer long awaits passage northward through the checkpoint. Vehicle queues appear in all available satellite imagery after 24 February. Four vehicles consistent with URAL-4320s appear along the path moving west around the border checkpoint.
A queue of people appears north of the permanent border checkpoint and east of the road obstacles. This queue appears to be waiting to reach a small green-roofed gatehouse at the site.

Vehicle queues, military vehicles (possible GAZ-type), and road obstacles remain visible as in previous imagery.
CHECKPOINT 02

Date: 2022.02.14
Source: WV01
Ground Sampling Distance: 50 cm
Off-Nadir: 14.5015°

Physical appearance of the location prior to the 24 February 2022 full-scale invasion.
CHECKPOINT 02

Vehicle queues are visible in nearly all available post-invasion imagery. Here a vehicle queue appears adjacent to a set of road obstacles, consistent with a military checkpoint. Several URAL-type military vehicles are present along the road. A possible Pantsir S1 SAM or BM-21 is also visible with a smaller military vehicle (a potential support or reload vehicle) nearby.